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Deciding whether or not to trust . . . is like deciding whether or not 
to climb a tree, because you might get a wonderful view from the highest 
branch, or you might simply get covered in sap, and for this reason many 
people choose to spend their time alone and indoors, where it is harder 
to get a splinter.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Property owners often choose not to bequeath assets to their loved 
ones outright, but instead choose to leave their wealth in the care of 
trusted advisors who can carry forth the original owners’ goals but also 
accommodate the survivors’ changing needs.  The vehicle for so doing—
a private donative trust—has been aptly characterized as a gift “projected 
on the plane of time and so subjected to a management regime.”2  This 
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 1.  LEMONY SNICKET, THE PENULTIMATE PERIL 14 (2005). 
 2.  Bernard Rudden, John P. Dawson’s Gifts and Promises, 44 MOD. L. REV. 610, 610 (1981) 
(book review); see also Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 215, 217–18 (2011) (describing the history and future of trusts); John H. Langbein, The Secret 
Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 165 (1997) 
[hereinafter Langbein, Secret Life] (noting that trusts are our “characteristic device for organizing 
intergenerational wealth transmission”).  Trusts provide a custodial and management mechanism by 
which one party, known as the settlor (or grantor, donor, or creator), empowers another, known as 
the trustee, to hold, administer, and distribute property for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries.  
Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and the Future of 
Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 n.1 (2008).  While property owners can and often 
do serve as trustees for trusts they have established for themselves, this Article focuses on non-
settlor trustees.  Moreover, although there are many different types of trusts, including charitable and 
business trusts, this Article focuses on the private donative trust, which is a wealth transfer 
mechanism usually used within a family.  See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the 
Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 630–31 (1995) [hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian Basis]; see 
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description is helpful because it highlights the trust’s central, defining 
characteristics—divided ownership and temporal uncertainty—which 
also contribute to the trust’s unique and sometimes perplexing 
challenges.3  As Denver-based estate planning lawyer John A. Warnick, 
founder of the Purposeful Planning Institute, has explained, trusts can do 
more than provide a mechanism for transmitting wealth efficiently by 
creating purposeful and collaborative legacies that address the human 
elements of estate planning.4 
To achieve these purposes, however, several obstacles must be 
surmounted.  First, the trust’s creator, known as its “settlor,”5 must select 
a person or entity to be the legal owner of the property and must decide 
what strictures to impose on (or freedoms to grant to) whomever is 
chosen; these planning decisions are made with the certain knowledge 
that circumstances surrounding the property and the beneficiaries will 
change.6  Second, as time passes, the trustee must decide how to organize 
investments and make distributions that satisfy often divergent goals and 
needs.7  Third, the beneficiaries—who have less information than the 
                                                          
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 113 (2009) (describing two types of donative trusts: “caretaker,” meaning that 
they are designed to terminate when the beneficiaries are able to care for themselves; and “dynastic,” 
meaning that the settlor’s primary motive is “to perpetuate and control the estate as long as 
possible”). 
 3.  See, e.g., 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. 
ASCHER, SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 1.1 (5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter SCOTT ON TRUSTS]; 
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs 
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 623 (2004); Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an 
Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2587–88, 2614 (2011). 
 4.  See Paul Sullivan, Focusing on the Human Element of Estate Planning, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/your-money/estate-planning-with-the-human-elem 
ent.html. 
 5.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 2.2.1.  
 6.  John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. 
L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2007); see also Cooter & Freedman, supra note 3, at 1046–48 (“Because asset 
management necessarily involves risk and uncertainty, the specific behavior of the fiduciary cannot 
be dictated in advance. . . . [U]nanticipated contingencies require continual recalculation to 
determine which course of action will be the most productive.”); Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting 
Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L. J. 67, 68–69 (2005) 
(explaining how a “settlor seeks a capable and conscientious individual or institution—an individual 
or institution that she trusts—to ensure the steady growth and continued availability of significant 
sums of money” even as she knows that future conflicts and questions may arise).  For more 
practical articles describing the selection of trustees, see Jo Ann Engelhardt, Avoiding Problems with 
Trust Agreements and Fiduciary Administration, 49 No. 5 PRAC. LAW. 37, Oct. 2003, at 37, 38–40; 
Michael McGowan, Caveat Trustor: Avoiding Pitfalls Can Make Trusts More Worthy, A.B.A. J., 
Nov. 1993, at 97, 97; Mark S. Poker & Amy S. Kiiskila, Prevention and Resolution of Trust and 
Estate Controversies, 33 ACTEC J. 262, 262 (2008). 
 7.  Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 649–56; Tritt, supra note 3, at 2606–09. 
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trustee—must be able to police the trustee’s conduct to make sure she is 
not misusing the trust property for her own benefit or failing to take care 
of it properly.8  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, private trust 
relationships are situated in a very specific context: among people who 
are related by blood or affection.9  In fact, trustees are frequently 
members of the family and beneficiaries in their own right.10  If the trust 
relationships are broken or damaged by means of a lawsuit or even just 
ongoing negative interactions, the results are not simply economic—they 
                                                          
 
 8.  Cooter & Freedman, supra note 3, at 1053–56; Leslie, supra note 6, at 112–13. 
 9.  See, e.g., Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 2014) (trust dispute between settlor’s 
grandchildren and their father and uncle); Carter v. Carter, 965 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), 
app. denied, 968 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. 2012) (trust dispute between child and her step-mother); 
Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 106 So. 3d 360 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied (Sept. 25, 2012), cert. 
denied, 105 So. 3d 326 (Miss. 2013) (trust dispute between mother and her son); Shelton v. 
Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741 (N.H. 2013) (trust dispute among siblings); In re Matthew Larson Trust, 831 
N.W.2d 388 (N.D. 2013) (trust dispute among siblings); In re Estate of Alden, 35 A.3d 950 (Vt. 
2011) (trust dispute among children, step-mother, and step-siblings); In re Estate of Cooper, 913 
P.2d 393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (trust dispute among child, her father, and her father’s second wife). 
 10.  See infra note 21.  Commentators often refer to the fact that trustee identity has shifted 
away from individuals and towards professional corporations.  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, A 
Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 775 (2000) (“Today, the 
vast majority of trusts are administered by large financial institutions, such as trust companies and 
trust developments of commercial banks.”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 
811 (1983) (“[I]n a predominantly mobile society, [family] fiduciaries have largely been replaced by 
commercial fiduciaries.”); David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1675, 1681 (2009) (“[I]nstitutional trustees dominate the market for medium and larger 
estates.”); John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 988–89 (2005) [hereinafter Langbein, Questioning] 
(“Professionalization has transformed trusteeship into a commercial relationship, now centered in the 
financial services industry, typically in bank trust departments.”); Langbein, Contractarian Basis, 
supra note 2, at 638 (“Private trustees still abound, but the prototypical modern trustee is the fee-
paid professional [institution], whose business is to enter into and carry out trust agreements.”); 
Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 633 (“The use of professional fiduciaries is reported to be on the rise.”).  To 
date, there have been few studies of who is actually serving as trustee, and those that do exist focus 
on data provided by institutional trustees.  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, 
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 
YALE L.J. 356, 359 (2005) (describing study of jurisdictional competition for trust funds that derived 
empirical data from annual reports filed by institutional trustees); see also V. Gerard Comizio & 
Jeffrey L. Hare, Regulatory Developments for Banks and Thrifts Conducting Trust and Fiduciary 
Activities, 59 BUS. LAW. 1299, 1300 (2004) (describing how banks have lost market share as other 
financial services companies began offering personal trust services).  Otherwise, any information on 
how institutional trustees compare to individual trustees, family or professional, in number of trustee 
appointments or value of assets under management, appears to be anecdotal.  See Tritt, supra note 3, 
at 2599 n.86 (“Short-term trusts of more modest means probably use individual trustees rather than 
corporate trustees.”); see also Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 633 n.57 (describing empirical work yet to be 
done).  And yet trustee identity can have important consequences.  See Melanie B. Leslie, Common 
Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713, 2714–
20 (2006); Paula A. Monopoli, Drafting Attorneys as Fiduciaries: Fashioning an Optimal Ethical 
Rule for Conflicts of Interest, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005).  Obtaining more concrete 
information on who is actually serving as trustee and how that matters is a project for another day. 
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are practical, and they are emotional, too.11  For a trust to function well 
and with “purpose” then, the various participants must trust the trustee, 
and the trustee must earn and maintain that trust.12 
In response to these challenges, scholars have offered alternative 
legal “symmetries and analogies” to help “illuminate” and “improve” 
how trusts and trust law are understood and function.13  Over the years, 
comparisons have been made to: the law of property and conveyances;14 
the law of contracts;15 the law of organizations and agency;16 and even 
the law of speech and expression.17  This Article proposes an alternative 
approach to thinking about private trusts and their trustees by using as a 
touchstone the legal system’s most highly scrutinized—and in an ideal 
form, trusted—decision-maker: the archetypal common law judge.  
Rather than discuss how courts and legislatures should view trustees, 
however, the Article focuses on how trustees, and the other parties to the 
trust relationship (including their respective counsel), should view 
themselves and each other.  The Article’s normative claim is that shifting 
the trust paradigm to envision a trustee as a judicial surrogate—an 
                                                          
 
 11.  See infra notes 125–36 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See Leslie, supra note 6, at 113.  Of course, some trusts work well, at least from the 
settlor’s perspective, where there is not trust between the trustee and beneficiaries. 
 13.  Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2181 
(2011); Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 630.  See infra notes 74–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 14.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(i) cmt. i (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959); Austin W. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 269–70 (1917); Gallanis, supra note 2, at 235; see also David Horton, 
Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 68–72 (2012) (describing property theory of testation); 
Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2181 (“The prevailing canon categorizes gratuitous transfers as a branch of 
property law—’family property law’ . . . .”).  
 15.  See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 664; see also FREDERIC W. 
MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 28 (John Brunyate rev. ed., 2d ed. 1936) (“[A] trust 
generally had its origin in something that we can not but call an agreement.”); Horton, supra note 10, 
at 1677 (“In the last decade, scholars and courts have begun conceptualizing the trust as a ‘deal’: a 
private agreement between the settlor and the trustee to manage the corpus.”). 
 16.  Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 623–24; see also Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions 
of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 435 (1998) 
(alluding to how common law systems for the law of trusts involve the “flexible rules” of agency).   
 17.  See Horton, supra note 14, at 65; see also Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential 
Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 455 (2012) (“By preparing an estate 
plan and implementing that plan through the execution of a will and other estate-planning 
documents, testators communicate to their friends, family, and community how they would prefer to 
dispose of their estates.”); Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 379, 385 n.23, 429–31 (2011) (arguing that testamentary documents, including wills and 
trusts, should incorporate expressive language); Karen J. Sneddon, The Will as Personal Narrative, 
20 ELDER L.J. 355, 366–409 (2013) (describing how wills contain and reflect the testators’ voices 
and stories). 
2015] TRUSTING TRUST 501 
arbiter, interpreter, problem-solver, mediator, and communicator—as 
opposed to an agent, partner, or contracting party will provide a way to 
build greater confidence in what might be called a trust community that 
originates with the settlor but is perpetuated by the trustee and 
beneficiaries as they interact on a daily basis.18  The ultimate goal of 
increasing trust is important because trust—or the simple act of relying 
on others to care for our interests19—has been shown to enhance 
interpersonal relationships and business interactions by increasing 
satisfaction and reducing transaction costs.20  Trustees who already 
exhibit the judicial qualities described below—and doubtless there are 
many—do not find themselves in the type of embroiled disputes with 
suspicious beneficiaries that can be so destructive.  A well-functioning 
trust relationship enhances the well-being of all its parties. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II sets forth the essential 
characteristics and tensions that define the private donative trust.  After 
examining the duties and understandings that bind settlor, trustee, and 
beneficiaries, this Part describes in greater detail the trust’s central 
challenges and the different legal frameworks that scholars have 
proposed in response.  Part III explains why analogizing the trustee to the 
common law judge is useful for evaluating trust relationships and offers 
fresh insights for some of the private trust’s internal governance 
                                                          
 
 18.  Recently, relying on Professor Tamar Frankel’s seminal work on fiduciary law, a trio of 
scholars has proposed a fiduciary theory of judging.  Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, & Michael 
Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CAL. L. REV. 699 (2013); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, 
FIDUCIARY LAW (2011); Frankel, supra note 10, at 795 (considering that fiduciaries “appear in a 
variety of forms”).  But if applying principles of fiduciary law to the role of decision-maker helps 
refine how a judge should approach the judicial process, applying ideas about judging to the role of 
trustee is equally illuminating because these principles that bear on trustworthy decision-making can 
help elicit and manage settlor expectations, evaluate and accommodate beneficiary needs, and guide 
fiduciary conduct.   
 19.  See AIDEN WARD & JOHN SMITH, TRUST AND MISTRUST: RADICAL RISK STRATEGIES IN 
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 8 (2003). 
 20.  See, e.g., Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo Degli Antoni, The Sources of Happiness: 
Evidence from the Investment Game, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 498, 507 (2010) (using investment game 
to show correlation between how much trust one individual placed in another and trustor’s self-
declared happiness); John F. Helliwell & Haifang Huang, How’s the Job? Well-Being and Social 
Capital in the Workplace, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 205, 220–22 (2010) (finding that workplace 
trust is “strong determinant” of job satisfaction and can allow companies “to reap rewards in some 
combination of . . . lower quit rates, lower monitoring costs, easier (and hence less expensive) hiring, 
and more effective effort from employees at all wage levels”); Yasuharu Tokuda, Seiji Fujii & 
Takashi Inoguchi, Individual and Country-Level Effects of Social Trust on Happiness: The Asia 
Barometer Survey, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2574, 2585–89 (2010) (describing how Asian 
cross-national research revealed association between trust and happiness).  See generally WARD & 
SMITH, supra note 19, at 1–37 (describing how different types of “trust” function independently and 
together to enhance business relationships). 
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dilemmas.  Part IV discusses the foundational requirements for a trusted 
decision-making process: impartiality, competence, integrity, and candor.  
Part V shows how applying the judicial paradigm to the trust relationship 
has theoretical and practical implications for trust design and 
administration.  For example, it supports the idea that trustees should 
disclose and explain their decision-making to the other parties affected 
by that process, not only for adversarial reasons, such as allowing 
beneficiaries to enforce their rights, but also for trust-enhancing reasons.  
This Part also applies the trustee-as-judge analogy to other key trust 
governance issues, including delegation of investment responsibilities 
and discretionary distribution standards, observing that some of the most 
respected rules follow a judicial model while some of the more 
controversial and highly criticized rules depart from it.  Finally, even 
where the judicial analogy appears to fall short—because independence, 
a central feature of judicial legitimacy, is not required for trustees21 —the 
analogy is useful because it highlights some deep-seated flaws 
underlying traditional notions about how best to select trustees.  
II. PRIVATE DONATIVE TRUSTS AND THEIR DYNAMIC DYNASTIC 
TRIANGULAR LIVES 
The donative trust—or “use” as it was first called—developed back 
in the thirteenth century as a mechanism for transferring real estate that 
otherwise was subject to various legal restrictions on transfer.22  Because 
courts of law did not recognize these “illegal” transfers, a beneficiary 
who wanted to complain about how her trustee—her “faithless 
feoffee”23—was treating the property was forced to seek justice from the 
Chancellor, “who granted relief on the theory that he was ‘compelling 
                                                          
 
 21.  See, e.g., Donkin v. Donkin, 314 P.3d 780, 798 n.1 (Cal. 2013) (sibling both beneficiary 
and co-trustee); Smith v. SunTrust Bank, 754 S.E.2d 117, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (daughter both 
beneficiary and trustee); Carter v. Carter, 965 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), app. denied, 968 
N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. 2012) (step-mother both beneficiary and trustee); Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 106 So. 
3d 360 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012), reh’g denied (Sept. 25, 2012), cert. denied, 105 So. 3d 326 (Miss. 
2013) (son and mother both beneficiaries and co-trustees); In re Estate of Alden, 35 A.3d 950 (Vt. 
2011) (step-mother both beneficiary and trustee); In re Estate of Cooper, 913 P.2d 393 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1996) (father both beneficiary and trustee). 
 22.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 1.4; see also Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries, 53 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 558 (2009) (“[T]he Anglo-American ‘trust,’ in which trustee is bound to 
beneficiary by fiduciary duty, evolved to permit circumvention of a variety of medieval property 
rules.”).  For example, such a legal restriction might be that the recipient was a member of the 
church and so could not own land.  See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 1.3 at 11–12.   
 23.  Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 634. 
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the trustee to act upon the dictates of his conscience’”24 and thereby 
“forc[ing] the trustee to abide by his pre-existing moral or ethical 
obligation.”25  In other words, the trustee may not have been breaking 
“the law,” but she was violating an equitable code.26  This birth in courts 
of equity makes sense because the delegation of trust was something of a 
leap of faith.  The property owner, knowing she could not hold and 
manage the property herself ad infinitum, would choose a trustee who 
would represent her interests after time had taken over.27 
The balance of this Part explores the donative trust vehicle, the 
challenges it poses, and various responses to those challenges.  Section A 
describes how creators struggle with designing trusts that balance 
flexibility and structure in order to anticipate future events and needs, 
without unnecessarily restricting the trustee’s ability to respond and 
react.  Section B describes the traditional fiduciary duties that apply to 
the trustee’s conduct, including the duties of loyalty and care and the 
many subsidiary duties that fall under these more general umbrellas.  
Section C looks at the various ways legal theorists have proposed 
characterizing the donative trust to solve its central dilemmas of divided 
ownership and temporal uncertainty. 
A. Trusts’ Challenges 
No property owner can predict perfectly how the years will affect her 
beneficiaries and her possessions.28  Beneficiaries’ needs will change, for 
example, as the beneficiaries marry or divorce, start or lose a business, or 
develop or overcome an illness or addiction.  Investments too will 
                                                          
 
 24.  Leslie, supra note 6, at 73 (quoting SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 1).   
 25.  Id. at 73; Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 263 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) 
(“[E]quity courts were known as courts of conscience.  Equity bore a close relation to natural law 
and natural justice, and moral norms infused all of its work.”).  Professor Smith’s essay provides a 
comprehensive discussion of the history of equity and its role in combatting the problem of 
opportunism.  
 26.  Smith, supra note 25, at 13 (“As an outgrowth of equity, it is not surprising that fiduciary 
law is . . . morally inflected.  But the connection is more than mere path dependence; it is 
functional.”).  Procedural rules too supported the trust’s foundation in the courts of equity because 
those courts could hear testimony from interested parties whereas courts of law refused to do so.  See 
Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 635–36. 
 27.  See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 
DUKE L. J. 879, 881 (“The evolution of fiduciary obligation thus owed much to the situation-
specificity and flexibility that were Equity’s hallmarks.”). 
 28.  See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1160 (2013). 
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change, for example, by under or over-performing, reacting to world 
events, or re-forming into a different shape altogether.  How the settlor 
would want her gift over time to accommodate these endless 
permutations is difficult to anticipate and therefore to counsel, which is a 
particular problem in a legal realm where the typical court resolving such 
a dispute would prioritize the settlor’s intention over all else.29  How 
does a property owner plan to achieve her purposes but retain the fluidity 
and flexibility to deal with the unanticipated? 
There are two possible approaches to this planning dilemma, and 
most trust arrangements combine gradations of each.30  The first is to 
draft a trust agreement that provides the trustee with clear distribution 
standards, describes the settlor’s primary concerns, and dictates 
responses to various contingencies that are likely to arise.  In other 
words, this approach uses language as its primary tool.31  For example, a 
common directive in many trusts that benefit different classes of 
beneficiaries, such as a surviving spouse and descendants, is to prioritize 
distributions to one over the other.32  A trustee alternatively might be 
                                                          
 
 29.  See, e.g., Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727, 730 (Ga. 2014) (“[T]he cardinal rule in trust 
law is that the intention of the settlor is to be followed.”); Carter v. Carter, 965 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 968 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. 2012) (“A court’s primary concern in 
interpreting a trust instrument is to discover the intent of the grantor, which the court will effectuate 
if it is not contrary to law or public policy.”) (citing Citizens Nat’l Bank of Paris v. Kids Hope 
United, Inc., 922 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ill. 2009)); In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d 
514, 521 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“A court’s purpose in interpreting a trust agreement is to ‘ascertain 
and give effect to the grantor’s intent.’” (quoting In re Stisser Grantor Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 502 
(Minn. 2012))); Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 746 (N.H. 2013) (“[W]hen we construe a trust 
instrument, ‘the intention of a settlor is paramount . . . .’” (quoting Appeal of Lowy, 931 A.2d 552, 
556 (N.H. 2007))); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013) (“[W]e enforce trust 
restrictions on the basis of the settlor’s intent.”); see also Kelly, supra note 28, at 1134 (“American 
succession law privileges ‘donor’s intention’ as the ‘controlling consideration’ in determining the 
meaning of a donative document.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003))); Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 638 (“[T]he law regularly 
subordinates the interests of the beneficiaries as residual claimants to the dead-hand interests of the 
settlor, an outgrowth of the frequently paternalistic function of the donative trust.”); see also infra 
notes 74–78 and accompanying text.  But see Gallanis, supra note 2, at 216 (“American trust law, 
after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving in a new direction, with a reassertion of the interests 
and rights of the beneficiaries.”).   
 30.  See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 6, at 89 (“Parties that cannot anticipate all potential agency cost 
problems rely on fiduciary duties as a substitute for express contract provisions.”). 
 31.  See Kristen E. Caverly, Help Clients Grant the Right Level of Trustee Discretion, 39 EST. 
PLAN. 18, 19–28 (2012) (providing samples of language to guide trustee discretion); Benjamin H. 
Pruett, Tales from the Dark Side: Drafting Issues from the Fiduciary’s Perspective, 35 ACTEC J. 
331, 341–47 (2010) (same).   
 32.  For examples of trust agreements that prioritize spousal interests, see Scanlon v. Scanlon, 
993 N.E.2d 855 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); In re Van Dusen, 834 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); 
O’Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 408 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transfer denied, (Oct. 29, 
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told: to distribute principal to a child for the purchase of a home or a 
business in the same manner that the trust’s settlor would have done, 
were she living; to retain a particular asset for sentimental reasons, 
regardless of its change in value; to terminate a trust if it becomes too 
small to be economical; or to distribute income to a spouse in accordance 
with “the lifestyle to which she had become accustomed.”  Although a 
trustee and court might have to interpret these instructions, the document 
will provide guidance as to preferences so long as the parties are willing 
to bear the administrative costs of drafting for contingencies and so long 
as no unanticipated changes occur.33  But all the planning in the world 
still cannot control the future.34  If a trust expresses preference for a 
spouse, who turns out to have sufficient independent funds, to the 
detriment of an ailing child, the trustee would arguably be required to act 
in contravention of the settlor’s unexpressed but probable intent and 
certainly not in all of the beneficiaries’ best interests, unless the trust 
were judicially modified.35 
Recognizing language’s inadequacy and humans’ inability to predict 
and plan for every contingency, the second approach to dealing with the 
imperfect foresight that accompanies a gift over time is to repose 
“absolute discretion” in a trustee.36  In other words, the trust agreement’s 
distributive and investment directives would be more expansive, 
allowing the trustee flexibility to deal with whatever inevitable 
                                                          
2013).  For an example of a trust agreement with language that does not express this priority, see In 
re Estate of Alden, 35 A.3d 950, 953–55 (Vt. 2011). 
 33.  See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 10, at 813 (“[T]he transaction costs involved in drawing up a 
detailed prior agreement covering all possible discretionary uses of power over the life of the 
relation would not only be enormous, but also would probably exceed the benefits of the proposed 
relation.  A more general document (whether a contract, trust, or charter) setting forth only the main 
purposes of the relation and the broad functions of the fiduciary would not impose such great 
transaction costs, but would less adequately prevent specific abuses of power.”); Kelly, supra note 
28, at 1158–61 (describing costs and contingencies); Leslie, supra note 10, at 2719 (“[Settlors and 
trustees] cannot draft agreements that accurately anticipate and resolve all future conflicts.”).   
 34.  Seth W. Krasilovsky, Exercising Discretion in Administering Discretionary Trusts, 36 EST. 
PLAN. 32, 32 (2009). 
 35.  While the trustee or beneficiaries might file a petition to modify or terminate the trust, 
doing so ordinarily requires a court proceeding and a finding that the trust’s “material purposes” are 
no longer being served or its terms are “administratively inconvenient.”  See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, 
supra note 3, § 16.4; see also UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 410–12, 7C U.L.A. 164–68 (Supp. 2003); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 65–66 (2003) (defining conditions for termination or 
modification of trusts); John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
1105, 1117–20 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules] (discussing trust modification); 
Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 658–63 (same).   
 36.  Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1425, 1430–33 (1961); see also Krasilovsky, supra note 34, at 34–35 (providing examples of 
“absolute discretion” language). 
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uncertainties time may engender.37  The settlor would choose a fiduciary 
that understood the settlor’s goals and therefore, even without specific 
words of guidance in the document, would be able to act as the settlor’s 
surrogate and administer the trust in accordance with her ideals.  But 
reposing so much faith and flexibility in a trustee puts significant 
pressure on the fiduciary relationship and prompts questions for the 
trustee about whose needs should take priority.38  Does the trustee defer 
to what the settlor would have wanted or does the trustee prioritize a 
strategy that will best serve the beneficiaries?39  As inadequate as the 
first approach may seem, because of the costs associated with trying to 
anticipate what will happen in the future and the gaps and chinks that are 
likely to appear with the passage of time,40 the second approach is 
equally troublesome because it offers little reassurance to the settlor that 
her vision will be followed, scant guidance to the trustee on how best to 
accommodate the different interests, and few guideposts to the 
beneficiaries on whether the trustee is acting in accordance with the trust 
that the settlor has reposed in her.  In fact, all this approach offers is a 
relationship, situated in the context of standards for fiduciary conduct 
generally.41  How can a trustee be trusted to deal with these problems?  
One answer lies in fiduciary law. 
                                                          
 
 37.  Halbach, supra note 36, at 1426–27; see also Peter B. Tiernan, A Trustee’s Duties and 
Responsibilities Under Discretionary Invasion Provisions, FLA. B. J., Oct. 2005, at 50 (describing 
standards of discretion that appear in trusts).   
 38.  Cooter & Freedman, supra note 3, at 1048–49.  Actually, this dilemma of delegation is 
inherent in any fiduciary relationship, where one party holds power over another, see Frankel, supra 
note 10, at 809–10, but is further complicated by the tripartite nature of the trust relationship.  
 39.  See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 40.  See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 3, at 1048–49.  Although default rules often help 
clarify obligations where an instrument is silent, see, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in 
Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1101 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hirsch, Default Rules], whether these default rules are satisfactory has been another 
subject of avid debate.  See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1172 n. 32; Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A 
Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 627–28 (2009); Hirsch, Default 
Rules, supra, at 1039; Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and 
Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 586–609 (1999) [hereinafter Leslie, Family Promises]; 
see also Leslie, supra note 6, at 70 (arguing that characterizing trustees’ fiduciary duties as “pure 
‘default rules’ . . . blinds academics and courts to the need to develop a coherent theory about the 
extent to which fiduciary duties can be modified”).   
 41.  See Pruett, supra note 31, at 341 (“One of the most difficult tasks trustees face is how to 
exercise broad (and generic) discretion in the administration of trusts, whether the trust is fully 
discretionary, with no standards whatsoever, or discretionary subject to an ascertainable standard.”); 
Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF 
THE TRUST 428, 430–31 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013) (“[Spelling] out with specificity what the trustee 
should do in all possible future circumstances [is] an impossible task given transaction costs and the 
settlor’s lack of clairvoyance.  Instead, trust law provides the trustee with expansive default powers 
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B. The Trustee’s Roles and Duties 
Repeatedly characterized as the quintessential fiduciary,42 the trustee 
wields tremendous power based on her legal ownership and control of 
the trust property, her superior access to information, and, in many cases, 
the experience, expertise, and even status that caused her to be appointed 
in the first place.43  Accordingly, her duties are significant, 
commensurate with her position and designed to combat any potential 
opportunism or laziness.44 
The trustee has a duty of loyalty that obligates her to put the 
requirements of the entrustor and beneficiaries before her own.45  The 
duty of loyalty prohibits the trustee from engaging in any transactions 
that are self-interested or conflicted, even if such actions might confer an 
economic benefit on the trust.46  If a trustee breaches her duty of loyalty 
to the beneficiaries by engaging in a self-interested or potentially 
conflicted transaction, any profits that the trustee earns belong to the 
beneficiaries with “no further inquiry.”47  This strong prophylactic rule is 
                                                          
of administration, the trustee’s exercise of which is subject to review ex post for compliance with the 
open-ended fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence.”).   
 42.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 804–05; Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. 
REV. 539, 540 (1949); see also DeMott, supra note 27, at 912 (characterizing trustee as “a powerful 
prototype” of the fiduciary); Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 641 (“The . . . office of the trustee serves as the 
organizing hub for the various relations that aggregate into the trust.”); Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary 
Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1361 (1994) (“Fiduciary relations typically include those of 
trustee/beneficiary, guardian/ward, conservator/conservatee, principal/agent, attorney/client, 
partner/partner, executor/legatee.”).   
 43.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 809–10, 813–14. 
 44.  See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 3, at 1048–57. 
 45.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.2; Langbein, Questioning, supra note 10, at 931; see 
also Frankel, supra note 10, at 823–24 (speaking to the fiduciary acting in the best interests of the 
entrustor); Cooper, supra note 2, at 1167 (stating that the trustee is “held to the highest fiduciary 
duty of loyalty” for the “sole interest of the trust beneficiaries”).  The most famous description of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty comes from Justice Cardozo’s decision in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter 
than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”); see also In re Estate of Rothko, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 
932–52, 965–78 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (relying on Meinhard to find fiduciaries to have breached duty of 
loyalty in connection with administering estate of Mark Rothko), modified, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1977), aff’d, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977). 
 46.  Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 655–56.  The only defenses a trustee may 
raise are that a court approved the transaction in advance or the other parties to the trust waived the 
conflict; otherwise, there is “no further inquiry” and any profits the trustee makes belong to the trust.  
See Alexander, supra note 10, at 776. 
 47.  Cooter & Freedman, supra note 3, at 1054–56; Leslie, supra note 6, at 112–13.  Because 
the beneficiaries’ interests are distinct from the trustee’s, the trustee must segregate and maintain 
trust assets separately.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.11. 
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designed to counter-balance the potential for misappropriation of 
opportunities that the trustee’s legal ownership of the property and 
superior information about it affords her.48 
The trustee also has a broad and overarching duty of care that can be 
further broken down into responsibilities for investments and 
distributions.49  With respect to investments, the duty of care once simply 
required the trustee to custody the assets and keep them safe.50  As trust 
property evolved from ancestral land to liquid assets, like stocks and 
bonds, trust investment law experienced a corresponding and seismic 
transformation too.51  Modern trust law now affirmatively requires the 
trustee to manage investments to achieve a favorable overall return, to 
understand a trust’s (and its beneficiaries’) purposes and risk tolerance, 
to diversify holdings, and to delegate investment responsibility if the 
trustee lacks the requisite expertise.52  In fact, trustees who delegate their 
investment duties to advisors, under modern rules, can escape liability 
for mismanagement, so long as the advisor was properly selected, 
directed, and monitored.53  To be deemed prudent, the trustee’s 
investment strategy must account for the competing needs of life and 
remainder beneficiaries.54  In tandem with these expectations, many 
jurisdictions have adopted statutes that give trustees flexibility to deal 
                                                          
 
 48.  Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 655–56. 
 49.  See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.6; Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, 
at 656. 
 50.  See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 640. 
 51.  See Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent 
Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 856–67 (2010) (describing evolution of modern 
investment rules). 
 52.  Sterk, supra note 51, at 853–54; see generally In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332, 336–
39 (N.Y. 1997) (describing standards of the “prudent person rule of investment”); John H. Langbein, 
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 645–46 
(1996) (citing and discussing modern rules under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts)). 
 53.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.3; UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 9 (1994); UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 807 (amended 2010). 
 54.  See Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 650–54; see also Carter v. Carter, 965 N.E.2d 1146, 1155–56 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 968 N.E.2d 1064 (Ill. 2012) (rejecting daughter’s claim that 
mother-trustee breached her fiduciary duties of impartiality and prudence by knowingly engaging in 
an investment strategy that prioritized income interest over remainder interests by investing solely in 
municipal bonds); Matter of Estate of Butterfield, 341 N.W.2d 453, 459 (Mich. 1983) (“Another 
duty of trustees is to be impartial in their investment policies.  Neither income beneficiaries nor 
remaindermen may be favored.  All trust beneficiaries must be dealt with impartially unless a 
different intent is clearly expressed in the trust document.”); Cooper v. Cooper, 913 P.2d 393, 398 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming trial court’s finding that father-trustee’s investment strategy, 
which weighed in favor of income over trust appreciation, was breach of duty to act as prudent 
investor).  
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with different types of property, often far more varied and volatile than 
the property trusts historically owned and managed.55 
The duty of care also requires the trustee to distribute assets 
appropriately.56  Although the trust relationship sometimes is 
characterized as triangular, based on the three categories of interested 
parties (settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries), in reality the relationship is 
more faceted.  For example, “the same person may play more than one of 
the three roles”57 and the roles may have internal divisions.  Beneficiaries 
who receive lifetime distributions have potentially adverse interests to 
the remaindermen because the more property that passes to one, the less 
that remains for the other.58  Even collateral beneficiaries—those who are 
on the same horizontal level, such as siblings—compete for 
distributions.59  The trustee has a duty to treat the beneficiaries 
impartially and accommodate their divergent interests when deciding 
whether to make a distribution.60 
Other duties, sometimes mentioned separately and sometimes as part 
of the more general duties of loyalty and care, can be characterized as 
process and enforcement-based.  For example, the trustee must file 
periodic accounts and keep beneficiaries informed.61  Donative trusts are 
often preferred over other gifting vehicles for the privacy advantages 
they offer,62 and it has not been uncommon for settlors and trustees to 
                                                          
 
 55.  See Sterk, supra note 51, at 853–54.   
 56.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, §§ 17.14–15. 
 57.  Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 438; see also, e.g., In re Trust No. T-1 of Trimble, 
826 N.W.2d 474, 488 (Iowa 2013) (involving revocable trust where settlor served as co-trustee and 
beneficiary served as co-trustee and executor of settlor’s estate). 
 58.  Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 650–52; see, e.g., In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d 
514 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (describing life beneficiary and remainder beneficiaries’ conflicting 
interests).   
 59.  Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Zaluda, A Trustee’s Balancing Act: Income and 
Remainder Beneficiaries’ Rights, 30 EST. PLAN. 12, 14 (2003).  
 60.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 803 (amended 2010); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§§ 183, 232 (1959) (stating that a trustee is “under a duty to deal impartially” with trust beneficiaries 
and that, “if a trust is created for beneficiaries in succession,” a trustee is under a duty to act “with 
due regard” to the interests of those successive beneficiaries); Ronald R. Volkmer, New Fiduciary 
Decisions: Issues Related to Alleged Breaches of Fiduciary Duties By Trustees, 39 EST. PLAN. 44, 46 
(2012) (citing and discussing cases).  
 61.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, §§ 17.4–5; Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 35, at 
1125–26; see also Leib et al., supra note 18, at 738 (discussing accurate bookkeeping 
responsibilities of the fiduciary). 
 62.  See Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts, 
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 725–27 (2006) [hereinafter Foster, Elusive Quest]; Frances H. Foster, Trust 
Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 559–65 (2008).  
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want to minimize disclosure obligations to maintain this privacy.63  Some 
reasons to do so might include a concern that beneficiaries will become 
lackadaisical, greedy, or meddlesome if they are given too much 
information about the trust.64  Accordingly, trustees have traditionally 
resisted disclosing what they are doing unless required to do so by the 
trust instrument or by law.65  In the modern era, both the Uniform Trust 
Code and state legislatures have required trustees to provide “qualified” 
beneficiaries with disclosure about trust activity.66  Professor Thomas 
Gallanis and others have argued convincingly that these disclosure 
requirements should be mandatory because they help monitor trustee 
misconduct and especially trustees’ opportunism.67  Some states have 
agreed, prohibiting settlors from waiving the requirement in their trust 
instruments, and others have not.68 
In thinking about fiduciary duties, it is worth noting how recent years 
have seen increased use of quasi-fiduciaries, known as “trust protectors” 
or “trust directors,” and a corresponding debate about their status.69  
Several jurisdictions permit a settlor to “designate a surrogate to receive 
                                                          
 
 63.  See Foster, Elusive Quest, supra note 62, at 750; T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to 
Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1603 (2007); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, 
and Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1914–15 (2000). 
 64.  Foster, Elusive Quest, supra note 62, at 763–64. 
 65.  But see Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1610–17 (arguing that disclosure requirements are 
consistent with trust history and economic theory). 
 66.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (amended 2010). 
 67.  Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1620–23; Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 35, at 1125–
26; see also Estate of Alden v. Dee, 35 A.3d 950, 956 (Vt. 2011) (“Disclosure by a trustee is 
fundamental to sound trust administration and the beneficiaries’ ability to monitor the trustees’ 
performance of their duties.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. d (2007)). 
 68.  See, e.g., In re Trust No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 485–89 (Iowa 2013)  
(describing disclosure rules and finding no duty to account to remainder beneficiaries for period 
during which settlor was alive and trust was revocable); Johnson v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 274, 283 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (requiring trustee, who was also present income beneficiary, to account to 
step-son, who had a vested but contingent remainder interest, even though trust agreement excused 
such accounting), vacated, 32 A.3d 1072 (Md. 2011); see also Foster, Elusive Quest, supra note 62, 
at 742–51 (describing various state and uniform statutes).  See generally Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee 
and the Remainderman: The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 173 (2011) 
(describing history of disclosure requirements and UTC and Restatement reforms). 
 69.  See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, at § 16.7; Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1624–26; see 
also Gregory S. Alexander, Trust Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2807, 2807–11 (2006) (discussing the utility of trust protectors); Richard C. Ausness, The Role of 
Trust Protectors in American Trust Law, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.  L.J. 319, 338–40 (2010) 
(same); Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Case Against the Trust Protector, 37 ACTEC L.J. 77, 81–91 
(2011) (same); Leslie, supra note 6, at 83 (same); Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust 
Protector: A Question of Fiduciary Power. Should a Trust Protector Be Held to a Fiduciary 
Standard?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 68 & n.1 (2010); Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency 
Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2763 (2006) (same). 
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and request information in lieu of the beneficiaries,” although they fail to 
address “crucial questions” such as “whether the surrogate owes 
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, what standard of care governs the 
surrogate’s actions or failures to act, and whether the surrogate has 
standing to sue the trustee for fiduciary breach.”70  Other functions 
assigned to these designees might include making distributions,71 
removing and replacing fiduciaries,72 updating the trust agreement for 
changes in the law,73 or other creative trust oversight functions. 
C. Responding to the Challenge: Existing Legal Taxonomies and 
Analogies 
Although the duties of a trustee might seem fairly straightforward 
and well established, they have led to an ongoing scholarly debate over 
whose interests a trustee should prioritize,74 and a continuing stream of 
litigation over whether the trustee is balancing the competing interests 
appropriately in light of her fiduciary duties, the trust instrument, and 
changes over time.75  On the one hand, “[a] central feature of fiduciary 
relations is that the fiduciary serves as a substitute for the entrustor,”76 
and the settlor’s intent as to how a trust operates is binding.77  On the 
other hand, a private trust is meaningless without beneficiaries, and the 
trustee’s primary responsibilities are to act on their behalf and for their 
benefit.78  In considering how to balance the rival interests of settlor and 
                                                          
 
 70.  Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1625. 
 71.  See, e.g., Shelton v. Tamposi, 62 A.3d 741, 746 (N.H. 2013) (trust “directors” for 
investments). 
 72.  Sterk, supra note 69, at 2768–69. 
 73.  Id. at 2766–69. 
 74.  See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1172 (“While the case law repeatedly reaffirms the traditional 
primacy of a settlor’s intent, the literature increasingly emphasizes the needs of trust beneficiaries 
and the dictates of modern investment theory.”); Gallanis, supra note 2, at 218–34 (describing shift 
from prioritizing settlor’s intent on issues of trust administration to prioritizing beneficiary needs); 
Horton, supra note 14, at 64 n.22 (describing the “vigorous debate” over what has been called the 
“benefit-the-beneficiaries” rule). 
 75.  See O’Riley v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transfer denied 
(Oct. 29, 2013); In re Estate of Hedke, 775 N.W.2d 13, 39 (Neb. 2009); In re Heller, 849 N.E.2d 
262, 266 (N.Y. 2006); Howard v. Howard, 156 P.3d 89, 89–91 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); Estate of Alden 
v. Dee, 35 A.3d 950, 957 (Vt. 2011). 
 76.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 808.   
 77.  See Kelly, supra note 28, at 1134; Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 638.   
 78.  AMY MORRIS HESS ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (3d ed. 2007); Cooper, 
supra note 2, at 1166–67; DeMott, supra note 27, at 901. 
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beneficiaries, scholars have proposed different “legal taxonomies”79 for 
the private donative trust.  The traditional view, long-held but still 
pervasive, sees trusts as property conveyances and fiduciary law as the 
mechanism for regulating the parties’ duties and obligations with respect 
to that property.80  Those who view trust law as property-based generally 
prioritize the beneficiaries’ interests in maintaining and growing the 
property over the settlor’s “dead hand” interests.81 
Another theory, put forth most famously in modern scholarship by 
Professor John Langbein, is that trusts are third-party beneficiary 
contracts between the settlor and trustee.82  Those who accept the 
contractarian approach believe that the settlor can define the trust’s 
parameters, regardless of the impact on the trust beneficiaries, except for 
certain mandatory rules the abrogation of which would “authorize the 
trustee to loot the trust.”83  This paradigm acknowledges the temporal 
nature of the trust relationship by comparing a trust to a long-term 
“relational contract” with its many managerial challenges.84  On the other 
hand, this analogy has been criticized for overlooking some of the most 
fundamental justifications for freedom of contract and neglecting the 
                                                          
 
 79. See Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2181 (“[L]egal taxonomy guides lawmakers to scout in given 
directions for relevant symmetries and analogies.  It serves, in other words, as a sort of compass, 
which—depending on how well it is calibrated—can send lawmakers wandering down blind alleys 
or lead them straight to the heart of things.”); see also Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 627–28 (describing 
“[e]arly participants in this debate, which has been ongoing for over 100 years” to include “Frederic 
Maitland (who took a contractarian perspective), Austin Scott (who took a proprietary perspective), 
and Harlan Fiske Stone (who took a contractarian perspective)”).   
 80.  See supra note 13; see also Alexander, supra note 10, at 768; Gallanis, supra note 63, at 
1621 (“The modern law of fiduciary administration enforces a proprietarian boundary on the 
settlor’s contractarian power.  The settler of an irrevocable trust is given significant room to control 
the trustee’s actions but cannot dispense with the core responsibility of the trustee to administer the 
trust in the interests of the beneficiaries.”).   
 81.  Gallanis, supra note 2, at 234–36. 
 82.  Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 652; Cooper, supra note 2, at 1182; see 
also Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2183 (arguing that “associating the law of gratuities with the law of 
contracts” pays “conceptual dividends”). 
 83.  Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 35, at 1106.   
 84.  Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 653–54 & n.151.  But see Leslie, supra 
note 6, at 78–79 (“The corporate ‘contract’ is relational, not contemplating a one-shot performance 
by each party, but a continuing relationship that may stretch years into the future. Parties cannot 
draft agreements that accurately anticipate and resolve all future conflicts” (footnotes omitted)).  For 
a definition of relational contracts, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981) (“A contract is relational to the extent that the parties 
are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations . . . because 
of inability to identify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize complex 
adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can be identified in advance.”).  For 
sources discussing relational contracts in the inheritance context, see Leslie, Family Promises, supra 
note 40, at 554 & n.3.  
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moral elements of fiduciary law.85  As authors of a book about trust and 
mistrust in business relationships have stated so vividly, contracts “are 
not good foundations for relationship development” because they are “as 
much something to hide behind” as they are vehicles for confronting 
difficult problems.86 
Acknowledging the “potential for considerable tension” between the 
trustee’s obligations to the settlor, as the “primary principal,” and to the 
beneficiaries, who have a “residual claim” to the trust property, Professor 
Robert Sitkoff has offered an organizational theory of trust law that seeks 
to “minimize the [transaction] costs . . . but only to the extent that doing 
so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of the settlor.”87  The 
organizational model has the advantage of recognizing the trustee’s 
contractual obligations to the settlor and fiduciary obligations to the 
beneficiaries,88 but also the limits of that model, both regarding internal 
governance—especially where tensions arise among different classes of 
beneficiaries—and relationships with external players, like creditors.89  
This model has been criticized, though, for prioritizing efficiency and 
reduced transaction costs, at least in practice if not in intent, and 
downplaying the many idiosyncratic and expressive reasons for which 
people establish trusts.90 
In response to the foregoing theories, which see “wills and trusts law 
as analogous to other fields that regulate the use, transfer, or investment 
of assets,” Professor David Horton argues that testation is fundamentally 
                                                          
 
 85.  See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 
305 (1999) (explaining how “contractualist” ideas differ from fiduciary duties in that the latter 
“facilitate the doing of justice, . . . promote virtue, and . . . enhance freedom in a distinctive way”); 
Hirsch, supra note 13, at 2193–95, 2207–10 (describing doctrinal areas where contracts and trusts 
have similar theoretical rationales but different approaches and results); Horton, supra note 14, at 
74–75 (describing differences between social welfare maximization rationale which supports 
freedom of contract and donative intent rationale which supports freedom of testation).  
 86.  WARD & SMITH, supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 87.  Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 640, 648. 
 88.  Id. at 624 (“In the prototypical donative trust, the settlor (‘S’) in effect contracts with the 
trustee (‘T’) to manage a portfolio of assets in the best interests of the beneficiaries (‘B1’ and ‘B2,’ 
collectively the ‘Bs’), subject to the ex ante restraints imposed by the settlor.” (emphasis added)).  
But see Tritt, supra note 3, at 2584–85 (criticizing “agency costs” theory, in part, because it 
disregards “whether trustees remain agents of settlors who create the trusts (and gratuitously transfer 
property into trust), the trust beneficiaries (who equitably enjoy the benefits of the gifts), or the trust 
itself” and ignores “the actions of a beneficiary that might create agency costs to other beneficiaries 
(for example, a current beneficiary affecting a co-beneficiary, remainder beneficiary, or contingent 
beneficiary)”). 
 89.  Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 650–57, 672–76. 
 90.  Tritt, supra note 3, at 2601–16; Horton, supra note 14, at 76–77.  
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different because it is “profoundly expressive.”91  After explaining the 
many ways that property owners use their wills and trusts to 
communicate their preferences, Horton examines how this recognition 
impacts trust doctrine.92  Most pertinently, he argues that when a court is 
evaluating whether a direction in a testamentary instrument should be 
honored or modified—in other words, whether such direction by the 
settlor should be respected or rejected as not beneficial to the trust’s 
beneficiaries—the court “should factor testamentary self-expression into 
the equation somewhere.”93  Thus, the “testation as speech” paradigm 
adds yet another competing interest into the consideration: the speech 
itself. 
While these ideas about how to think of trusts are insightful, they 
have not ended the conversation about how to prioritize interests nor 
increased trust among parties to the trust relationship.  In fact, in seeking 
to create a totalizing paradigm, theorists have highlighted just how much 
of a legal patchwork trust law is.  Moreover, that legal patchwork has 
affected how people in the world function within trust relationships.  
Trustees continue to struggle with investment and distribution directives, 
estate planners continue to struggle with drafting to accomplish settlor 
and beneficiary wishes and needs, settlors continue to struggle with 
selecting trustees and guiding their conduct, and beneficiaries still 
express dismay with trustee decision-making.  Also, current scholarship, 
for the most part, focuses on management strategies, and liability for 
mismanagement, and downplays the question of how and when a trustee 
should make distributions.94 
In a recent piece entitled A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, the authors 
propose a “judge-as-fiduciary” framework that, they contend, provides a 
“normative benchmark” for how judges should conduct themselves.95  
Accepting that fiduciary law is a “centuries-old rubric that governs 
trusting relationships,”96 the authors explain how it can “help guide some 
                                                          
 
 91.  Horton, supra note 14, at 89.   
 92.  Id. at 89–111. 
 93.  Id. at 108. 
 94.  See Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 650–51 (describing the trust as a 
voluntary deal between settlor and trustee consisting of numerous default rules and stating that the 
trustee “is normally indifferent to the distributive provisions”); Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 661–62 
(describing in a single paragraph how decisions regarding trust modification require consideration of 
settlor intent regarding distributions).  But see Horton, supra note 14, at 66 (recognizing that “an 
owner’s distributional choices can be highly (albeit implicitly) expressive”). 
 95.  Leib et al., supra note 18, at 703.   
 96.  Id. 
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of today’s most controversial debates”97 about the judiciary.98  A 
Fiduciary Theory of Judging provides historical and functional reasons 
why judges should be considered fiduciaries, including that they are 
entrusted to exercise discretion on behalf of people who have far less 
power than they themselves wield,99 and that they must do so in a way 
that balances independence and constraint.100  Most importantly for the 
purposes of this Article, the authors show that the two theoretical 
constructs are useful touchstones for each other because each helps to 
illuminate and even reframe some of the controversial questions about 
the other.  Rather than thinking about the trustee as an agent of the settlor 
or, alternatively, as an agent of the beneficiaries, comparing judges and 
trustees involves seeing the trustee as a decision-maker whose purpose is 
to find and expose a common ground that serves all of the parties’ 
interests in light of the trust’s challenges of fractionalized ownership and 
temporal uncertainty.101  This framework can therefore have a powerful 
effect on how settlors choose trustees and guide their conduct and how 
trustees meet their investment and distribution obligations to satisfy 
settlor goals and beneficiary expectations.  The next Part describes the 
power of this analogy. 
III.  ENVISIONING TRUSTEES AS JUDGES 
One of the reasons why the legal interactions among settlor, trustee, 
and beneficiaries stimulate so much discussion is that current law 
envisions these parties in an adversarial relationship, which is hardly 
surprising given the multiple and diverse interests involved in the typical 
private donative trust.102  The settlor has a vision for how her property 
will be held, invested, and distributed; the trustee has obligations 
imposed both by the law and the trust instrument; and the beneficiaries 
have needs that sometimes conflict with those of other beneficiaries and 
                                                          
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See, e.g., id. at 731–36 (observing the many ways that the fiduciary duty of loyalty already 
applies to judges and arguing that loyalty also supports stricter recusal standards); id. at 736–38 
(observing the many ways the fiduciary duty of care already applies to judges and arguing that care 
supports a more cautious use of law clerks); id. at 738–52 (observing how the fiduciary duties of 
candor, disclosure, and accounting apply to judges and arguing that these duties also support an 
obligation of “deliberative engagement”). 
 99.  Id. at 714–17. 
 100.  Id. at 705. 
 101.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 831–32.   
 102.  See, e.g., infra note 249 (describing cases). 
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possibly with what the settlor had originally intended.103  Underlying 
these interests is the fact that trusts are intended to be dynamic vehicles 
that facilitate property management when the original owner is no longer 
around to respond to new events that may change the property and the 
beneficiaries.  In the owner’s stead, the trustee must adapt and react.  If a 
trust relationship is functional, it should proceed intact and supervised by 
the parties; if it is dysfunctional, it may end up in court or at least in 
turmoil.104 
Consider, for example, a recent case, In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital 
Trust, that is simply one among many disputes about trusts, but is useful 
because it illustrates beautifully both the challenges posed by gifts over 
time and the problems that can arise when a beneficiary loses 
confidence—or trust—in the trust’s decision-maker.105  The Van Dusen 
settlor and his wife, Virginia, married in 1978, both having been married 
                                                          
 
 103.  See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See Leslie, supra note 6, at 104 (“American courts ‘have invariably played an active and 
indispensable role’ in monitoring long-term relational contracts; the American tolerance for 
contractual freedom has typically been counterbalanced by judicial activism in monitoring for 
opportunism.” (citation omitted)); Leib et al., supra note 18, at 729 (“As a general matter, we tend to 
see large-scale compliance with private fiduciary obligations because the norms are so deeply rooted 
and function mostly extrajudicially.”); Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
665, 685–86 (2009) (same). 
 105.  In re the G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).  While 
the case provides a useful illustration, it is simply one of many examples of trust administration 
disputes that drained trust assets and could have benefited from enhanced procedures of the type 
discussed below.  For other examples, see Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727, 730 (Ga. 2014) 
(discussed infra at notes 251–59 and accompanying text); Smith v. SunTrust Bank, 754 S.E.2d 117, 
121–22 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (absence of accountings and single letter from corporate trustee to 
beneficiaries announcing its future distributions led, in part, to beneficiaries objecting when trustees 
moved to terminate trusts as uneconomical); Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1031–33 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991) (finding lawyer-trustee to have breached a duty of “inquiry and distribution” that 
ultimately resulted in beneficiary losing his home); Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 106 So. 3d 360 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2012), reh’g denied (Sept. 25, 2012), cert. denied, 105 So. 3d 326 (Miss. 2013) (granting 
removal petition because, among other things, trustee secretly recorded mother/co-trustee); O’Riley 
v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 410–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transfer denied (Oct. 29, 2013) 
(describing trustee’s communications with beneficiaries, finding distribution decisions reasonable, 
and denying damages claim for failure to provide account statements; describing how beneficiaries 
felt ignored); Miller v. Bank of Am., 326 P.3d 20, 26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013), cert. granted, 326 P.3d 
1112 (N.M. May 1, 2014) (“Beneficiaries received limited information about the [Trustee’s] actions, 
had many unanswered questions about the management of the Trusts, and the [Trustee] actually 
misrepresented the value of the Building that was carried on its books.”); Cooper v. Cooper, 913 
P.2d 393, 395 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), review denied by 928 P.2d 414 (Wash. Nov. 13, 1996) 
(describing substantial fees paid by trust where “[trustee] filed his wife’s will and started a probate.  
But he took no further steps to conclude the probate until [beneficiary] filed this action.  [Trustee] 
did not keep a separate estate account and continued to manage all of the former community 
property as his own.”). 
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before and with adult children from their prior unions.106  The revocable 
trust agreement, which the settlor created in 1981, provided for income 
as the settlor requested during his life and, on his death, for three 
separate trusts: a marital trust (the Marital Trust); a trust funded with the 
settlor’s remaining exemption from generation-skipping transfer tax (the 
GST Trust); and a family trust funded with any assets remaining in the 
marital trust after the death of the settlor’s wife (the Family Trust).107  
Both the GST and Family Trusts benefited the settlor’s children and 
more remote descendants.108  The Marital Trust, though, benefited 
Virginia, providing her with all income and principal as the trustee 
deemed “advisable to provide for her health, education, support, 
maintenance and care.”109  In determining whether to make a principal 
distribution to Virginia, the trustee was directed to “use principal 
liberally” to maintain Virginia “insofar as possible the standard of living 
to which she was accustomed during” the settlor’s lifetime.110  The trust 
agreement further provided that the trustee was under no obligation “to 
consider other assets or income available” to Virginia and specifically 
acknowledged that the Family Trust might never be funded if Virginia 
consumed all of the assets of the Marital Trust.111  Finally, Virginia was 
given the power to “compel conversion” of any unproductive property to 
make it productive.112  Although the trial court stated that the language of 
the agreement was “certainly not a model of clarity,” it is hard to imagine 
a trust agreement that is any clearer in expressing the settlor’s intent to 
benefit a surviving spouse over remainder beneficiaries than the Van 
Dusen agreement. 
The settlor died in 1999 and for approximately ten years the 
surviving spouse, Virginia, received income from the trust and varying 
amounts of principal, though far less than she had lived on when the 
settlor was alive.113  During this period, the trustee and Virginia 
                                                          
 
 106.  In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d at 517. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  The entire provision is quoted in the trial court order, which can be found at In re Van 
Dusen Marital Trust, No. 27TRCV1063, 2012 WL 217240, at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 20, 2012), 
rev’d, 834 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) [hereinafter Van Dusen Trial Court]. 
 110.  In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d at 517–18. 
 111.  Id. at 518.  
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. (“Between 2000 and 2011, Virginia received an average of approximately $93,000 per 
year in income distributions from the Marital Trust.  During the same period, Virginia received no 
principal distributions in some years and varying amounts of principal distributions in other years: 
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“appeared to enjoy a good relationship,” until Virginia learned that the 
trustee had failed to make a sizable principal distribution some years 
earlier;114 the source of Virginia’s knowledge about the error is not 
discussed in either the lower court or appellate opinion, although both 
opinions insinuate that the trustee’s mode of communicating the mistake 
was neither forthright nor conciliatory.115  Accordingly, a decade after 
the trust was funded, Virginia started requesting that the trustee make a 
series of larger principal distributions to help her pay various living 
expenses and attorney fees.  The then institutional trustee116 sought a 
meeting to discuss whether Virginia’s financial situation had changed to 
justify the increased distributions and thereafter denied Virginia’s entire 
request.117  Again, it is not clear in what form the denial came and 
whether the trustee provided any explanation to Virginia at that time. 
Based on a valid concern that granting Virginia’s requests might 
eviscerate the remainder beneficiaries’ interests and thus violate its duty 
of impartiality, the trustee sought guidance from the probate court,118 
which approved the trustee’s exercise of discretion in all respects.119  The 
appellate court reversed.120  Recognizing the trustee’s duties to the 
remainder beneficiaries, the appellate court nevertheless found that the 
trust agreement required the trustee to distribute principal “liberally” to 
                                                          
$6,507 in 2002; $6,467 in 2005; $16,528 in 2006; $17,811 in 2007; $60,019 in 2008; $49,204 in 
2009; $23,404 in 2010; and $73,771 in 2011.”).  
 114.  Id.; see also Van Dusen Trial Court, supra note 109, at *9 (“Jean Morse, one of Virginia 
Van Dusen’s daughters-in-law, eventually discovered that the $49,000 distribution had not been 
made.”). 
 115.  Van Dusen Trial Court, supra note 109, at *9 (“Mrs. Van Dusen repeatedly emphasizes the 
fact that the Trustee never informed her about the error, and for this (and the error itself), the Trustee 
should be removed for breach of its duty of loyalty.”); see also id. at *8 (“Virginia Van Dusen 
argues that the Trustee violated its duty of loyalty by failing to make a $49,247.42 principal 
distribution, requested by Mrs. Van Dusen in 2001, and subsequently failing to inform Mrs. Van 
Dusen that it had not been made.  The Trustee argues that this was potentially due to an error or 
oversight by the Trustee, but that such an error has since been corrected, as the Trustee distributed 
the funds in 2011.”); id. at *10 (“The Trustee does have a duty to communicate with Mrs. Van 
Dusen and keep her apprised of situations involving the Trust and their own conduct.  However, 
their failure in this instance is tempered by the fact that Mrs. Van Dusen was clearly aware of the 
error . . . .”). 
 116.  Originally an individual trustee served with the corporate trustee, but the individual 
resigned without appointing a successor and, under the trust agreement, the corporate trustee 
thereafter served alone.  There were some allegations that the resignation was prompted by the 
corporate trustee.  “Wells Fargo, through Lowry Hill, has administered the Trust as the sole trustee 
since 2001, after the resignation of the former co-trustee . . . .”  Van Dusen Trial Court, supra note 
109, at *2.   
 117.  In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d at 518–19. 
 118.  Id. at 519. 
 119.  Van Dusen Trial Court, supra note 109, at *15. 
 120.  In re G.B. Van Dusen Marital Trust, 834 N.W.2d at 521. 
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maintain Virginia’s style of living and allowed Virginia to compel the 
trustee to convert “unproductive” (which the court interpreted to be non-
income producing) property into “productive” (or income producing) 
property, even if these actions resulted in the settlor’s adult children 
never receiving property from the trust.121  That Virginia had foregone 
certain choices during the prior ten years was irrelevant to future 
distributions because the trust agreement’s distribution standard directed 
the fiduciary to model the lifestyle to which the settlor’s wife was 
accustomed when the settlor was living.122 
Although the ultimate result in Van Dusen is consistent with the 
terms of the trust and not surprising in the least, having to rely on judicial 
intervention led to exorbitant attorney’s fees and costs,123 years in 
litigation, and ultimately a fractured relationship among the participants 
to the trust.124  By steadfastly maintaining its long-standing approach to 
distributions and not taking an affirmative role in deciding how the trust 
language applied to Virginia’s and the other beneficiaries’ changing 
needs, the trustee created, in the words of the parties and trial court, an 
“unworkable system for going forward.”125  Moreover, the trustee, when 
faced with its own clear distribution error, minimized the mistake’s 
importance; no real communication occurred with Virginia until she was 
already angered and adversarial.126 
So what purposes are served by using judges as touchstones for 
trustees?  Both trustees and judges are imbued with decision-making 
                                                          
 
 121.  The appellate court found merit in Virginia’s three primary arguments: first, that the trustee 
had not exercised its discretion to deny requests for principal distributions; second, that the trial 
court erred by approving the trustee’s requirement that the beneficiary justify an increase in her 
current standard of living because the agreement ensured her the standard of living that existed 
during her marriage; and third, that the trustee should not have considered other sources of income 
when determining her need for distributions of trust principal.  Id. at 520–26. 
 122.  Id. at 522–23. 
 123.  Although not all of the parties’ fees were disclosed, the appellate decision indicates that the 
remainder beneficiaries’ attorney’s fees and costs came to $274,556.67.  Id. at 525.  It is likely that 
the settlor’s wife and the trustee, separately represented, would have incurred equally large expenses, 
resulting in a collective bill of nearly one million dollars.   
 124.  “The trial court denied Virginia’s motion to remove the trustee, although it did not 
foreclose the parties agreeing to a resignation and replacement, and denied the motion to have an 
individual co-trustee appointed to serve with the institutional trustee.”  Van Dusen Trial Court, supra 
note 109, at *17.  The jurisdiction did not allow removal of the trustee without fault.  But cf. In re 
McKinney, 67 A.3d 824, 826 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (describing and invoking Pennsylvania trust law 
provision that allows trustee to be changed due to “substantial change of circumstances”). 
 125.  Van Dusen Trial Court, supra note 109, at *16–17. 
 126.  See supra notes 114–17 and infra note 250.  
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power and corresponding responsibilities.127  Although judges are not the 
only decision-makers whose conduct has tremendous impact on others’ 
lives,128 how judges instill their decision-making process with legitimacy 
and, in so doing, inspire trust, has been the subject of significant research 
and scholarship.129  There are admittedly differences between what a 
judge does and what a trustee does, including that the former serves a 
public role while the latter acts in a private capacity,130 but both must 
exercise discretion in the face of competing interests, both must interpret 
and apply texts to fluid factual contexts, and both occupy a special 
position of power vis-à-vis the people whose lives they affect and whose 
property is at stake.131  Beneficiaries of private trusts are most frequently 
people with whom the trust’s creator has personal and intimate ties, 
either through blood, marriage, or other affinity.  Indeed, “[t]rusts are . . . 
being used by broader segments of society than in the past, and with 
greater diversity of objectives (ranging from tax and probate avoidance, 
to property management late in life, to highly sophisticated multifamily, 
multigenerational plans of disposition).”132  Although creators often have 
                                                          
 
 127.  See David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2011) (“In the fiduciary relationship, the beneficiary is dependent on 
the fiduciary to act after her interests and the fiduciary is, accordingly, obligated to use her entrusted 
discretionary power in pursuit of the beneficiary’s interests.”). 
 128.  Some early readers of this Article suggested that arbitrators and mediators, who, like 
trustees, deliberate in private and are often selected for their substantive knowledge about the 
matters in dispute, provide a more apt analogy.  Although trustees’ similarities to these private 
arbiters are noteworthy, the Article’s focus on building trust in decision-making makes judges the 
most useful point of comparison primarily because their decision-making process has been the 
subject of such extensive study.  
 129.  See infra notes 174–84 and accompanying text.  
 130.  See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers 
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1099–1103 (2010) (describing the relationship between publicity 
and sincerity); Leib et al., supra note 18, at 728–29 (describing how fiduciaries’ actions, unlike 
judges’, are subject to further judicial review, but explaining that compliance with private fiduciary 
obligations is widespread “because the norms are so deeply rooted and function mostly 
extrajudicially”). 
 131.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 808–09; Leib et al., supra note 18, at 706–08, 718–19.  Indeed, 
courts sometimes refer to trustees having to act “judiciously.”  See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 844 
So. 2d 789, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Although the trustee of the trust in the instant appeal has 
absolute discretion to pay out income and principal to the beneficiaries, he still must exercise good 
faith and be judicious in the administration of the trust.” (emphasis added)); Dunkley v. Peoples 
Bank & Trust Co., 728 F. Supp. 547, 558 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (“[A] grant of even ‘absolute discretion’ 
does not absolve the trustee from liability for breaching his duty to act judiciously in the 
administration of the trust estate.” (emphasis added)).  The Uniform Trust Code recognizes the 
judicial analogy by allowing trustees to be removed from office for less than misconduct, when the 
beneficiaries so request and when removal is not inconsistent with the trust’s material purposes.  
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(4) (amended 2010). 
 132.  Halbach, supra note 63, at 1883.   
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economic motivations, such as saving taxes or providing beneficiaries 
with creditor protection,133 they also have emotional motivations, such as 
love, fear, and jealousy.134  After all, leaving a legacy means designing a 
mechanism to promote your wishes for how your property will be 
administered after you die.  The settlor may love her child but fear that 
the child will spend all of her property if she receives it outright.  The 
settlor may love all of her children equally but fear that one will 
encounter greater need than the others as time passes.  The settlor may 
love her spouse and want that spouse to have lifetime access to the 
property but fear that when the spouse no longer needs the property, he 
will divert it outside the family to a new spouse or children who are not 
the settlor’s children.  Private trusts are for the most part, then, about 
emotions, relationships, and families,135 however the family unit is 
defined.136  Even if the trustee is a professional,137 she is hired in part 
because she either knows or has been made familiar with the family’s 
history and can make decisions about managing and distributing the 
family members’ assets in ways that fit the different members’ needs.138 
Comparing trustees to judges helps illuminate ways in which trust 
law, trustee conduct, and trust decision-making depart from standards 
that have been characterized as trustworthy in the judicial context; 
besides that, the project of comparing the two is “worthwhile, possible, 
and perennially interesting.”139  As the next Part will illustrate, the 
qualities that define effective judges and facilitate principled and credible 
decision-making are helpful in evaluating how those who decide to use 
trusts to transfer their property might think about trust design and trustee 
                                                          
 
 133.  Sitkoff, supra note 3, at 674–77. 
 134.  I have discussed the emotional component to estate planning elsewhere.  See Deborah S. 
Gordon, Letters Non-Testamentary, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 585, 590 (2014).  In this recognition, I am 
not alone.  See Cooper, supra note 2, at 1191 (“[M]any settlors engage in estate planning and 
establish trusts in order to benefit their chosen beneficiaries in a variety of ways—not only 
financially, but also personally and perhaps even spiritually.”); Tritt, supra note 3, at 2582–83 
(describing “trust law and practice” as “complex, highly idiosyncratic, and emotionally charged”). 
 135. See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 2.1.4 (“The Trust as a Relationship”). 
 136.  Gallanis, supra note 2, at 217 (“The garden-variety trust arises from the noncommercial 
transfer of property, typically within a family.”); see also Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm of 
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 228–35 (2001) (describing limitations of traditional but 
pervasive definition of family as purely biological and offering alternatives). 
 137.  See supra note 10.   
 138.  See Leslie, supra note 6, at 83–86.   
 139.  Leib et al., supra note 18, at 702. 
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selection.  Marrying flexibility to structure is what trust relationships 
require and what principled judicial decision-making provides.140 
IV. THEORIES OF DECISION-MAKING: QUALITIES THAT DEFINE 
EFFECTIVE JUDGES AND FACILITATE PRINCIPLED AND CREDIBLE 
ADJUDICATION 
Starting with Justice Cardozo,141 modern jurists, scholars, and 
philosophers have debated the qualities that define an effective judge in a 
democratic society and “the relevant normative guideposts that should 
constrain or inform [judicial] interpretation.”142  While conversation 
about the judicial process is by no means over,143 certain principles have 
emerged as so well-accepted that they have been incorporated into codes 
of conduct that apply to judges of every type and in virtually every 
United States jurisdiction.144  As the preamble to the American Bar 
Association’s 2010 Model Code of Judicial Conduct explains, our 
                                                          
 
 140.  RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 355–57 (2013). 
 141.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921).  
 142.  Leib et al., supra note 18, at 699–700; see also POSNER, supra note 140, at 356–57 (“What 
we can expect in a very good judge, and ‘find in abundance in Cardozo’s opinions, are (1) a vivid, 
even dramatic, bodying forth of the judge’s concerns, (2) a lucid presentation of arresting 
particulars—fodder for academic analysis, (3) a sense of the relatedness of these particulars to larger 
themes, (4) a point of view that transcends the litigants’ parochial concerns . . . , (5) a power of clear 
and forceful statement, and (6) a high degree of sensitivity to the expectations of one’s audience.’” 
(quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 133 (1990))); Paul Horwitz, 
Judicial Character (and Does it Matter), 26 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 98 (2009) (recognizing that 
when discussing the judicial function, “we all stand in the shadow of Benjamin Cardozo’s grand 
work”). 
 143.  See Leib et al., supra note 18, at 700 (“Justice Cardozo started the modern conversation 
about the role of the judge in American democracy, but no one has been able to complete it.”); see 
also Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1173 (2009) (describing symposium on empirical studies of judicial decision-making); Susan B. 
Haire & Rorie Spill Solberg, Introduction the Behavior of Federal Judges, 97 JUDICATURE 71 
(2013) (describing a symposium on a book about behavior of federal judges); Judith Resnick, Trial 
as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 
(2000) (describing federal judiciary’s transformative shifts in priorities throughout the century and 
the implications of those shifts on principled adjudication, at least in the federal courts); Helena 
Silverstein, Introduction to Symposium on Keith J. Bybee’s All Judges Are Political–Except When 
They Are Not, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 190 (2013) (describing symposium on a book about 
relationship between judging and politics). 
 144.  See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3–4 (1988); Keith A. 
Swisher, The Moral Judge, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 637, 666 (2008); see also Benjamin B. Strawn, Note, 
Do Judicial Ethics Canons Affect Perceptions of Judicial Impartiality?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 781, 786–
88 (2008) (tracing history of codes from ABA enactment of “Canons of Judicial Ethics” in 1924 
through ABA enactment of the “Model Code of Judicial Conduct” which, in its 1990 form, was 
adopted by every state other than Montana).  
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society depends on judges who “aspire at all times to conduct that 
ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence, 
impartiality, integrity, and competence.”145  The stated purposes for these 
rules are to “fulfill the public trust” and “maintain and enhance 
confidence in the legal system.”146 
The judicial process functions as it should when judges act with 
impartiality, integrity, and competence; they are able to convey these 
qualities to their audiences by providing mindful and sincere 
explanations of their reasoning.147  These elements of principled 
adjudication, and the ways that they are applied to judicial conduct, 
provide a useful touchstone for trustee conduct, too.  Accordingly, the 
remaining sections describe how scholars, jurists, and commentators 
have thought about and questioned each of the foregoing essential 
components of judging.148  While a full exposition of how judges 
manifest these qualities in their day-to-day work is a task far beyond the 
reaches of this Article, even a simplified exploration of these essential 
elements of the judicial process, and the questions they raise especially 
when they are absent, is helpful in establishing a framework for building 
trust. 
A. Judicial Impartiality 
That a common law judge should be impartial in exercising her 
discretion is perhaps the most universally recognized, albeit fervently 
debated, component of a credible and principled judicial process.149  At 
                                                          
 
 145.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT PREAMBLE 1 (2010). 
 146.  Id. (“Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts that judges, 
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to 
maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.”). 
 147.  See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 
498 (2013) (“Plato recounts that in 399 BC, Socrates described a judge’s responsibilities in the 
following way: ‘Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider 
soberly, and to decide impartially.’” (citation omitted)); Swisher, supra note 144, at 657–61, 666–67 
(describing a judge’s prime directive as applying rules within context and a judge’s prime virtue as 
open-mindedness).  
 148.  Although judging also can involve collective action by multiple adjudicators, space 
constraints have dictated that this Article focus on decision-making by an individual.  Similarly, a 
trust does not allow for a “jury”; in fact, it is interesting to think about whose peers would serve.   
 149.  See Geyh, supra note 147, at 494 (“‘Judicial impartiality’ is a feel-good term, like 
‘puppies’ and ‘pie,’ that no decent soul would denigrate.”); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial 
Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605, 605 (1998) (“We expect our judges to be, 
above all else, impartial arbiters so that legal disputes are decided according to the law free from the 
influence of bias or prejudice.  The principle of judicial impartiality is dictated by statutory and 
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its most concrete, judicial impartiality means independence from control 
by forces or influences that are not relevant to the legal question at 
issue.150  Accordingly, a judge is expected to disqualify herself if she or 
any of her close associates has a personal financial interest in a case or a 
tie to one of the litigants or their representatives; indeed, even if there is 
no personal tie, a judge must recuse herself if her affinities raise an 
appearance of partiality and thereby cast suspicions on her motives.151  
The reasons for judicial independence are manifest; were a judge to be 
personally associated in some way with the litigants or the result, or even 
appear to be so associated, the parties and the public might lose 
confidence in the judicial process, regardless of outcome.152  As 
                                                          
common law, is required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, and is essential to due process of law. . . . 
[but] [p]ure impartiality is an ideal that can never be completely attained.  Judges, after all, are 
human beings . . . .”).  See generally Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the 
Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L. J. 255, 265 (1961).  
 150. See Geyh, supra note 147, at 498–509 (using non-legal sources to document different 
categories of partiality, including “judges who have personal interests in case outcomes; judges who 
have relational interests in case outcomes; judges who have political interests in case outcomes; and 
judges who have personal biases for or against case participants that are unattributable to the judges’ 
personal, relational, or political interests.”).  The requirement that the judiciary remain independent 
from political or other insidious influence was so fundamental to Alexander Hamilton and his peers 
that they conferred life tenure on federal judges so they would not to be subject to political pressures 
that might come with reelection campaigns.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465, 469 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—
EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 6–13 (2010) 
(discussing political influences on state and federal judges).  
 151.  Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality 
“Might Reasonably Be Questioned,”14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 57 (2000); see also In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even 
the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is 
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.”).  Subpart (A) of section 2.11 of the 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT PREAMBLE, dealing with “Disqualification,” requires a judge 
to disqualify herself “in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.” 
 152.  See Abramson, supra note 151, at 66–67 (describing appearance of partiality standard and 
its application in federal and state courts as necessary “to maintain a high level of public respect for 
the judiciary”); Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial 
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 532 (2005) (“Congress intended judges to recuse themselves in 
such cases so that ‘justice satisfies the appearance of justice,’ which will in turn ‘promote public 
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.’”).  On the other hand, a judge should not 
disqualify herself simply because a case presents a particularly difficult or controversial question or 
has the potential to lead to an unpopular result.  See id. at 534 (“Judges are given life tenure and 
salary protections not just so they can hold their own against the other two branches of government, 
but also so that they can take positions opposed by the majority of the public.”); cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. 
REV. 606, 618–19 (2002) (describing “duty to sit” doctrine that was specifically overturned but is 
still influential).  Accordingly, the rule’s nuances lie in the types of ties that are inappropriate or at 
least sufficiently questionable as to raise an appearance of impropriety and therefore a question 
about the judge’s independence.  Justice Frankfurter, for example, disqualified himself from a case 
involving two bus passengers who were complaining about music played during their morning 
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discussed in Part IV, this ideal is particularly interesting when applied to 
trustees, who often have beneficial stakes in the trust property that are 
distinct from the interests they hold as decision-makers, because it 
exposes a potential vulnerability in building trust which, at the very least, 
must be anticipated and confronted.153  Indeed, what might seem at first 
to be a defect in the analogy because so many trustees are not impartial is 
useful because it exposes flaws in traditional notions about the wisdom 
of appointing family members as trustees. 
Judicial impartiality, in a broader but more essential sense, means 
taking an open-minded approach to the issues in dispute, rather than 
being predisposed to a particular outcome.154  After all, the root of the 
word “prejudice” is “prejudge.”155  Thus, although “each judge comes to 
the bench with a unique background and personal philosophy,” 
impartiality requires that she greet each legal problem with fresh eyes.156  
What seems to be an indisputable idea, though, has spawned significant 
normative analysis about what judicial review should endeavor to be and 
significant positive analysis about what judicial review actually is.157  
                                                          
commute, stating, “My feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy 
that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it.”  Shaman, supra note 149, at 620 
(quoting Public Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.)).  In contrast, 
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg have declined to recuse themselves, respectively, from cases involving 
personal acquaintances and organizations with which they are involved.  See Frost, supra note 152, 
at 531–33. 
 153.  See infra notes 312–21 and accompanying text.  
 154.  Shaman, supra note 149, at 619–24; Swisher, supra note 144, at 638; Patricia M. Wald, 
Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and 
Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 888–90 (1987). 
 155.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 979 (11th ed. 2003); see also Geyh, 
supra note 147, at 498 (“The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘impartial’ as ‘[n]ot partial; not 
favouring one party or side more than another; unprejudiced, unbiased, fair, just, equitable.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 156.  CARDOZO, supra note 141, at 112; see also, e.g., Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 232 (2008) (“The simple prescription that judges should do the ‘good’ 
thing . . . places trust in the judiciary, deciding case by case, to assess the facts and law and policy of 
cases and—drawing upon their diverse individual backgrounds and ideologies—to ultimately reach a 
‘good’ legal rule . . . .  Judges are ideologically influenced in reaching their decisions, but they are 
far from pure ideologues. Judges certainly attend to the law, but they are not simply legalistic.  
Instead, they are balancers of various immediate and systemic interests at stake in litigation.”). 
 157.  See generally Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) 
(discussing and criticizing normative judicial review theory).  Some of the dominant but opposing 
schools of thought are the “legalist” theory, the “attitudinal” theory, the “strategic” theory, and the 
“aretaic” theory.  See Horwitz, supra note 142, at 102; Cross, supra note 156, at 187.  Legalism, 
which is “the prevailing mindset of the American lawyer, even in a post-realist age” posits that 
judges do and should decide cases based on “a body of rules constituting the ‘law’ rather than by 
factors that are personal to judges” and that acceptable answers are “derived largely if not wholly 
from the legal materials at hand.”  Horwitz, supra note 142, at 102–03 (quoting RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 41 (2008)).  In contrast, the “attitudinal” model of judicial process 
“argues that judges can best be understood as ‘acting purely on the basis of their policy preferences’” 
 
526 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Though commentators agree that the adjudicative process loses 
credibility if litigants and the public view a judge as having decided a 
case before hearing and considering the evidence and arguments, how 
“real life” judges should conduct themselves is less straightforward. 
Again, Justice Cardozo is of some help.  He saw impartiality, and the 
consistency it fosters, as “one of the most fundamental social interests” 
of the law and explained that “[t]here must be nothing in [the judicial 
process] that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or 
fitfulness.”158  While a judge need not (and many would say cannot) 
detach herself from a lifetime of “inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, 
acquired convictions,” Cardozo explained that a judge must endeavor to 
disregard her preconceived ideas every time she is interpreting and 
applying the law.159  Instead, she must rely on precedent, history, custom, 
logic and philosophy to ensure that the law develops symmetrically, but 
must also balance these factors against “the social interest served by 
equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare” in deciding 
cases.160  And when asked how a judge is to “know when one interest 
outweighs another” in order to reach a fair decision, Cardozo replied, “I 
can only answer that [she] must get [this] knowledge . . . from life 
itself.”161 
Though eloquent, this directive does not provide much concrete 
guidance on the “pragmatic quest . . . for ‘impartial enough.’”162  
                                                          
so, for example, judges appointed by a republican president will decide cases based on a republican 
ideology.  Horwitz, supra note 142, at 105 (quoting Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: 
Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 132 
(2007)).  Proponents of a “strategic” theory expand the attitudinal model to encompass not just 
immediate policy choices but also potential reactions to the decision that will impact the judge’s 
long-term policy preferences. Id. at 105–06.  Others theorize an “aretaic” or virtue-centered model 
that “focuses on the desirability of judges possessing ‘the judicial virtues—courage, temperance, 
judicial temperament, intelligence, and practical wisdom.’”  Id. at 108 (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 478 (2005)).  
 158.  CARDOZO, supra note 141, at 112. 
 159.  Id. at 112–13; see also David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial 
Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (2001) (“[a]n ethical judge must demand of herself that 
she identify and understand her own biases and how they affect her reaction to a case.”). 
 160.  CARDOZO, supra note 141, at 112–13.  
 161.  Id. at 113; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Cosimo, Inc. ed., 
2009) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”); Wald, supra note 
154, at 895–97 (describing “the audacity of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and 
Learned Hand to assert the legitimacy of judicial discretion in a common law regime”); Shaman, 
supra note 149, at 610–17 (contrasting Justice Holmes’s detachment with Justice Cardozo’s 
passion). 
 162.  Geyh, supra note 147, at 510, 541; Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 235, 235 (1999) (“Judging is a complex, case-specific, and subtle task . . . ; 
reducing the process to the level of checking a box on a ballot discredits the responsibility with 
which . . . judges have been entrusted . . . .”). 
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Recently, Professor Charles Geyh has provided a systematic theory that 
conceptualizes impartiality as occupying three “distinct dimensions”—
procedural, political, and ethical—depending on which participants’ 
goals are being considered.163  The procedural dimension relates to the 
parties to a case, who seek a fair process and are “more apt to accept 
adverse outcomes” if they perceive that they were treated in a way that 
protected them from the perils associated with a partial judge.164  If a 
judge acts prematurely to dispose of a case, for example, the parties will 
perceive the judge as having prejudged the matter and the process as 
therefore unfair.165  Geyh explains that for parties, “the interest in judicial 
impartiality is personal to them, acutely felt, case-specific, and shaped by 
firsthand experience.”166  Geyh’s second dimension of impartiality 
involves members of the public, who may not be directly affected by the 
outcome in a particular case but seek institutional legitimacy generally.167  
In comparison to the parties, “the public’s interest in an impartial 
judiciary is less personal than philosophical or ideological, more diffuse 
than acute, systemic rather than case-specific (although highly publicized 
cases can breed systemic concerns), and shaped less by firsthand 
experience than by impressions gleaned from public discussions on the 
acceptability of judges to the body politic.”168  Though trusts, because 
they are private, are not available for public scrutiny, this second 
dimension of trustee impartiality, with its institutional focus, relates more 
closely to the creators—settlors and their estate planning lawyers—who 
establish these relationships and set their parameters.169  Geyh’s third 
dimension of impartiality relates to the judge, for whom this quality is 
central to her “ethical” view of self.170  Although judges have personal 
interests in the procedural and political dimensions, their “self-identity as 
good judges is tethered to the oath they have sworn to be impartial—an 
                                                          
 
 163.  Geyh, supra note 147, at 497. 
 164.  Id. at 511. 
 165.  Id. at 522; see also id. at 514–22 (discussing how this interest is regulated by the Due 
Process clauses of federal and state constitutions, by disqualification rules, and by rules of litigation 
procedure, all of which must be balanced against the systemic costs that the procedural rules 
engender); infra notes 216–23 and accompanying text (discussing work of Professor Tom Tyler on 
process). 
 166.  Geyh, supra note 147, at 511. 
 167.  Id. at 511–12.   
 168.  Id. at 512; see also id. at 539–40 (discussing how this interest is regulated by mechanisms 
for judicial removal, selection, and oversight).   
 169.  See infra notes 306–07 and accompanying text. 
 170.  Geyh, supra note 147, at 512.   
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oath judges have taken for centuries.”171  How much partiality is 
tolerable will “depend[] on which objective is at issue and the constraints 
to which the applicable system of regulation is subject.”172  As discussed 
in Part IV, this tripartite approach to impartiality as it relates to audience 
is particularly helpful when thinking about how trustees, even those who 
are not independent, can act impartially.173 
B. Judicial Integrity 
Canon 1 of the Model Code mandates that a judge “act at all times in 
a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary.”174  “Integrity,” which connotes 
morality or notions of right and wrong, is easier to define in its 
absence.175  A judge who accepts bribes or kickbacks, for example, lacks 
integrity.176  Similarly, a judge who decides a matter based on an 
arbitrary mechanism, such as a roll of the dice or the party’s physical 
appearance on a particular day or even the judge’s reliance on substances 
that distort her thinking, for example, lacks integrity.177  In addition to 
undermining confidence in the law that the judge has made, this type of 
conduct is dangerous because judges can “give momentum to—or stop—
trends developing in the legal profession.”178 
                                                          
 
 171.  Id.; see also id. at 523–29 (discussing how this interest is regulated by codes of judicial 
conduct and shows why reversal, rather than discipline, is appropriate if a judge makes an honest 
mistake). 
 172.  Id. at 527; see also id. at 541–51 (providing examples of how different cases involving 
same-sex marriage, pleading requirements, disqualification, and free speech test all three dimensions 
of impartiality).   
 173.  See infra notes 302–07 and accompanying text. 
 174.  MODEL CODE, supra note 145, R. 1.2. 
 175.  Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 239 (2008) (“It is easy to define extreme misconduct in the negative—
like taking bribes in exchange for favorable rulings. It is difficult, however, to define what moral 
conduct is in the affirmative.”); see also Joan Didion, On Morality, in SLOUCHING TOWARDS 
BETHLEHEM 157 (1968) (questioning the meaning of morality and the use of the term in society). 
 176.  See Stephanie Chen, Pennsylvania Rocked by ‘Jailing Kids for Cash’ Scandal, CNN (Feb. 
24, 2009, 10:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/23/pennsylvania.corrupt.judges/; Ben 
Evans, Judge on Trial Before Senate, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2010/sep/13/judge-on-trial-before-senate/. 
 177.  See Swisher, supra note 144, at 656 n.87 (describing judicial coin-tossing and resulting 
discipline); Robert Patrick, Judge Rejects Plea Deal for Former St. Clair County Judge in Drug 
Case, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/federal-judge-rejects-plea-deal-for-former-st-clair-county/article_5bc071d3-eb8a-5925-bcec-
b0868780b479.html (describing Missouri judge’s ten-year drug addiction).   
 178.  Lebovits et al., supra note 175, at 239. 
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Accordingly, the ideal judge displays an impeccable and virtuous 
character.179  And we expect this integrity to appear both in the judge’s 
private life and her public one.  When Sol Wachtler, chief judge of the 
New York Court of Appeals, was revealed as having stalked his long-
time companion, a matter wholly unrelated to what many would 
characterize as a brilliant judicial career, the public’s and the bar’s 
confidence in him was shaken, and Judge Wachtler resigned in 
disgrace.180 
But a judge need not be amoral, corrupt, or criminal to lack integrity.  
A judge lacks integrity any time she misuses or abuses her power.  If she 
overreaches to decide an issue that is not presented to the court, she lacks 
integrity.  She also acts without integrity when she refuses to decide a 
matter that is properly before her court, just because the matter is 
unpleasant or difficult.181  Indeed, to the extent that we see judges as 
recipients of a “public trust,” we demand that they wrestle with society’s 
worst dilemmas, even if the results of their decisions are unpopular 
ones.182  Accordingly, judicial integrity requires a judge to rule with 
restraint on matters appropriately before her but to refuse to overreach 
when those matters are not presented to her directly.183  As described in 
Part IV, ideas about judicial integrity are particularly helpful in 
responding to the idea that trusts are foremost managerial and 
commercial, rather than moral, devices.184 
C. Judicial Competence and Diligence 
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to “be faithful 
to the law and maintain professional competence in it.”185  This directive 
                                                          
 
 179.  See Horwitz, supra note 142, at 99 (review of books that focus on “identifying the 
character traits that distinguish the admirable, excellent, or virtuous judge.”).   
 180.  See Catherine S. Manegold, Judge and Heiress: The Rise and Fall of a Private Affair, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 15, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/15/nyregion/judge-and-heiress-the-rise-
and-fall-of-a-private-affair.html. 
 181.  See Geyh, supra note 147, at 513 (“Ethics rules forbid recusal except when disqualification 
is required because ‘[j]udges must be available to decide the matters that come before the court,’ 
while the ‘rule of necessity’ directs otherwise disqualified judges to hear cases when no other judge 
would be qualified to sit.” (quoting MODEL CODE, supra note 145, R. 2.7, cmt. 1)).  
 182.  Leib et al., supra note 18, at 740–52 (describing “deliberative engagement”).  
 183.  See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 644–56 (1995); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996). 
 184.  See infra notes 288–301 and accompanying text. 
 185.  Shaman, supra note 149, at 617–18 (citing MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
PREAMBLE (2010)). 
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seems obvious and easy to satisfy; after all, judges usually reach their 
posts because they are lawyers who have demonstrated some proficiency 
in and affinity for the law and have a desire to immerse themselves more 
fully in it.  “Professional competence” implies diligence, too; judges 
must decide their cases promptly so that parties do not languish in the 
courts.186  Arguably the least disputed requirements for a principled 
judicial process, the duties of competence and diligence do, however, 
reveal gaps in the decision-making process and thus help to highlight 
some effective methods to fill those gaps. 
For example, judges increasingly face cases that present complex 
and highly specialized matters about which the adjudicators have little 
expertise or experience.187  Consider, for example, having to opine on the 
extent of patent protection for genetic sequences and modifications,188 or 
the taxability of modern artwork,189 or human egg donations.190  
Competence seems more elusive when faced with such esoteric but 
important disputes.191 
                                                          
 
 186.  Samuel K. Benham, Note, Judicial Purgatory: Strategies for Lawyers, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 
585, 588–89 (2010); see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Adverse Publicity as a Means of Reducing 
Judicial Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases 
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 513–20 (1993) (describing 
“defensible delays,” which are those attributed to “burgeoning caseloads,” too few judges, structural 
inefficiency, and case complexity, and “indefensible delays,” which are “precipitated by 
nonstructural inefficiency, indecision, inertia, belligerence or disability.”). 
 187.  See POSNER, supra note 140, at 54–95 (describing challenges posed by “external” 
complexity, which means complexity that is generated outside the legal system). 
 188.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 
(2013) (holding that a “naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent 
eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not 
naturally occurring”); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013), reh’g denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 24 (2013) (holding that a farmer who buys genetically modified and patented seeds may not 
reproduce those seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission). 
 189.  See, e.g., Calder v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 713, 714 (1985) (determining “fair market value” for 
estate tax purposes of over 1000 gouache paintings); Estate of Mitchell v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1435, at *12 (T.C. 2011) (discussing valuation of paintings by prominent American Western 
artists); Estate of Elkins v. Comm’r, No. 16597-10, 2013 WL 892399, at *87–88 (T.C. Mar. 11, 
2013) (determining “fair market value” for estate tax purposes of various works of art, including “a 
large Henry Moore sculpture, a Pablo Picasso drawing, and a Jackson Pollock painting.”). 
 190.  See Perez v. Comm’r, No. 9103-12, 2015 WL 393047 (T.C. Jan. 22, 2015) (Holmes, J.) 
(positing whether compensation received for the sale or donation of human eggs and related services 
is taxable income). 
 191.  Specialty courts have been proposed as a response to such complexity but have been met 
with widespread dissatisfaction.  See POSNER, supra note 140, at 94–95; see also Chad M. Oldfather, 
Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 847, 850 (2012) (concluding that 
although specialized judges may have a claim to expertise “in the weak sense that they will be more 
efficient in reaching conclusions than non-experts” the content of their decisions is unlikely to 
“differ in some qualitative respect from—or be in some general sense ‘better than’—those of their 
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When the requisite judicial knowledge involves learning an 
unfamiliar area of law, judges can attain competence through good, old-
fashioned research and analysis.  After all, some of this country’s highest 
ranking and most respected judges came to the bench with experience 
that differs substantially from the legal issues they now encounter 
regularly.192  As every first-year law student knows, practicing law is 
fundamentally about analogizing and distinguishing existing cases, 
statutes, and rules in order to apply them to new and unfamiliar 
questions;193 facility with traditional and online forms of legal research 
should allow even a novice judge to achieve competence in an unfamiliar 
area of law.194  And the adversarial system is designed to incentivize the 
lawyers to help the judge in this endeavor, albeit often in ways that 
advance the parties’ respective positions.195  Even novel questions of first 
impression should not test a judge’s legal competence to reach a 
decision; a probate judge, for example, who is considering the very 
interesting and difficult questions presented by a smartphone “last will 
and testament” has a body of established will doctrines upon which she 
can rely.196 
When the expertise required of a judge involves particularly 
complex, novel, or unfamiliar facts, however, traditional venues of legal 
learning may not be adequate to attain “competence.”197  Again, think 
patenting of genes or taxability of human body parts.  In such cases, 
judges might invite attorneys or professors who have particular 
background to submit “friend of the court” briefs.198  These amicus 
                                                          
generalist counterparts”). 
 192.  See generally Gregory L. Acquaviva & John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State 
Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 1203, 1232–38 (2009) (describing prior judicial and 
employment experience for state judges); Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme 
Court Justice Pre-Appointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1138–62 (2012) (describing prior 
experience of Supreme Court justices). 
 193.  See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 17–21 (3d ed. 2011); Emily 
Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1179–81 (1999); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741–42 (1993). 
 194.  Judges can sustain their legal competence by participating in some form of continuing 
education.  POSNER, supra note 140, at 331–37. 
 195.  See Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
859, 864–65 (2013) (“In deciding what the law is (and is not), a judge consults her own accumulated 
legal wisdom, the briefs, the oral arguments, and even Google search results.”).   
 196.  See Gordon, supra note 134, at 630 n.238 (describing questions of first impression 
involving iPhone and tablet wills). 
 197.  See Jed S. Rakoff, Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age of Economic 
Expertise, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 4 (2012); see also POSNER, supra note 140, at 54–94 
(discussing the competency of judges). 
 198.  See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
315, 315–16 (2008) (defining amicus curiae briefs).   
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curiae briefs, even if they are not neutral, can highlight concerns that 
might be less apparent to someone who does not face the same situations 
on a regular basis.199  Likewise, expert testimony is a way for a court to 
become educated and therefore competent on esoteric questions.200  
Though experts hired by litigants offer opinions that are inherently 
partisan, and therefore must be vetted as reliable before they are offered 
to a jury,201 judges can use the expert testimony to learn about the 
technical and complex issues involved in the case without necessarily 
adopting the expert’s conclusions.202  Because the judge ultimately is 
accountable for the decision and its results, she must evaluate expert 
testimony like other facts and interpret and apply that testimony through 
an exercise of her reasoning and discretion.203  Trustees, like judges, rely 
on expertise from external sources.204  As Part IV discusses, the extent to 
which judges seek, use, and rely on this source of knowledge can provide 
                                                          
 
 199.  See id. at 316–18 (discussing how use of amicus curiae briefs has flourished and examining 
whether courts should limited filings).  See generally Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: 
From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963) (describing historical and modern evolution 
of amicus curiae briefs, including how they can provide helpful information to courts and highlight 
implications of courts’ rulings).  Though amicus briefs are less prevalent in trial proceedings, there 
are times when they are appropriate.  See, e.g., Michael F. Smith, Litigating Cases with Questions of 
First Impression, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 101, 103 (2014). 
 200.  Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really Different?, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2013) (“[A]s legal questions become ever more technical, whether 
because they involve difficult scientific questions or complex financial transactions or something 
else, expertise is becoming more rather than less necessary.”); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory 
committee’s note to 2000 amendment (“Yet it might also be important in some cases for an expert to 
educate the factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to 
the specific facts of the case.  For example, experts might instruct the factfinder on the principles of 
thermodynamics, or bloodclotting, or on how financial markets respond to corporate reports, without 
ever knowing about or trying to tie their testimony into the facts of the case.”).  
 201.  See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (“the trial judge must 
determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the 
relevant] discipline.’” (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993))).  
Some have argued that the same gatekeeping function is needed for judges because they are no better 
than jurors in evaluating evidence or deliberately disregarding information that is inadmissible.  See 
Schauer & Spellman, supra note 200, at 11 & n.50 (citing sources); Andrew J. Wistrich et. al., Can 
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1251, 1260 (2005). 
 202.  POSNER, supra note 140, at 297–98 & n.11 (discussing how judges might appoint “neutral” 
expert witnesses and citing sources). 
 203.  In valuation cases, for example, “the Tax Court frequently adopts a compromise value even 
if the parties did not offer specific testimony of that value, provided that it is within a range of 
figures that the evidence supports.”  Diana S.C. Zeydel & Norman J. Benford, Valuation Principles 
and Recent Developments: Practical Guidance for the Estate Planner, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 207, 213 (1999).   
 204.  See infra notes 267–68, 281–84 and accompanying text. 
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guidance to trustees on their parallel solicitation and reliance on 
“experts.”205 
D. Judicial Credibility through Mindful Rhetoric 
Judicial impartiality, integrity, and competence go a long way toward 
enhancing the legitimacy of our legal system’s decision-making process 
and building trust in it.  This credibility is essential because, without it, 
litigants might as well resolve cases by way of arbitrary or self-help 
mechanisms and save themselves enormous time, money, and 
agitation.206  But in order to inspire such confidence, the audiences for 
the decision must understand how it was reached.207  When a judge 
provides her audiences with the bases for her decision, whether through a 
written opinion or an oral one, she provides access to the legal reasoning 
that underlies and has driven the result.208  In an essay celebrating the 
                                                          
 
 205.  See infra notes 280–87 and accompanying text. 
 206.  See Lebovits et al., supra note 175, at 244 (“The law forbids vigilante, or ‘self-help,’ 
justice. If individuals believe they will receive unexplained outcomes in the judicial forum, reliance, 
self-help might become the norm.”); James L. Gibson, Judging the Politics of Judging, in WHAT’S 
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT 282–86 (Charles Gardner Geyh, ed. 2011)  (describing legitimacy theory 
and its application to the judiciary).  Increasingly, because of delays, uncertainties, and mounting 
expenses, parties opt to resolve their disputes outside of the courts.  See Resnick, supra note 143, at 
928, 936–37; Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2007).  While this private and unofficial justice offers certain economic 
efficiencies, it threatens to deprive litigants—and those with less powerful voices—of their day in 
court and to lead to unpredictable and sometimes inconsistent results.  Harry T. Edwards, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 679 (1986); Resnick, supra 
note 143, at 999, 1000; Peter L. Murray, Privatization of Civil Justice, 15 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & 
DISP. RESOL. 133, 141 (2007). 
 207.  See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 
(1978) (“[T]he fairness and effectiveness of adjudication are promoted by reasoned opinions. 
Without such opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation in the decision has 
been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account their proofs and 
arguments.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 221 
(1985) (“Even if silent judgments are in fact well considered, the audience for court decisions is 
understandably suspicious.  A judgment expressing no reasons presents the appearance of 
arbitrariness.  Our [circuit] promises a decision with no waiting time if the parties stipulate that they 
will forgo an opinion.  In my nearly five years on the court, not a single litigant has ever invoked the 
‘prompt decision but no opinion’ prescription.  The parties to an appeal, particularly the losers, want 
to know the reason why.”); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
731, 737 (1987) (“[R]easoned response to reasoned argument is an essential aspect of [the judicial] 
process.  A requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds of decision that can be 
debated, attacked, and defended—serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of 
power.”). 
 208.  See Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 
(2008) (describing Justice Breyer’s use of an oral dissent through which he “appealed to shared and 
heartfelt values, not just compelling logic and clear reason . . . and seemed to sense that the premises 
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hundredth anniversary of the Harvard Law Review, then District of 
Columbia Circuit Judge Patricia Wald observed that “[f]or a 
conscientious judge, the simple obligation to write an opinion 
persuasively explaining the outcome of a case is a profound constraint on 
judicial discretion.”209  Her then colleague Judge, now Justice, Ruth 
Bader Ginsberg echoed these sentiments five years later when she 
explained that “the effective judge . . . strives to persuade, and not to 
pontificate.”210  An essential component of the judicial process, then, is 
rhetorical.211 
That principled judging commands not only an impartial, thoughtful, 
and diligent consideration of the case but also a reasoned explanation, 
rather than a “blind announcement,” of the result is not controversial.212  
But this component of the judicial process raises a number of more 
nuanced questions in its application, including: for whom is the 
explanation intended; what form should that explanation take; and, if an 
explanation is proffered, what ensures that it sets forth the judge’s actual 
reasoning, thereby satisfying the credibility goal, rather than a selectively 
deceptive reason provided solely to rationalize or insulate the result?213 
                                                          
behind the logic, the stories and not just the explanations, really mattered.”); Chad M. Oldfather, 
Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1344–45 (2008) 
(describing how the act of writing can help judges examine and test their conclusions); Patricia M. 
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1371, 1372 (1995) (“One of the few ways [judges] have to justify our power to decide matters 
important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we decide as we do.”); Nancy A. Wanderer, 
Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 49–52 
(2002) (describing how clearly written and well-reasoned judicial opinions are foundational to 
American jurisprudence).   
 209.  Wald, supra note 154, at 904; see also Shapiro, supra note 207, at 737 (“[C]andor is the 
sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by 
constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing about 
them and to say another.”).  
 210.  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1992). 
 211.  Rhetoric has been defined as “simply the art of persuasion.”  Jane B. Baron & Julia 
Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 146 (1997); see also James Boyd White, Law as 
Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 
(1985) (citing the definition from Plato’s Gorgias that rhetoric is “the art of persuading the people 
about matters of justice and injustice in the public places of the state.”).  For more general 
discussions on rhetoric, see SONJA K. FOSS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON RHETORIC 4–
7 (3d ed. 2002). 
 212.  See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1421, 1448 (1995); see also Wald, supra note 208, at 1375 (“Rhetoric will always be tied to 
[results].”); Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1002–05 (2008) 
(describing reasons why providing justifications enhances judicial legitimacy).  But see Schauer, 
supra note 183, at 657 (“[R]eason-giving can thus be seen as contingent rather than necessary, a 
style of decisionmaking with disadvantages of excess commitment that might at times outweigh its 
advantages.”). 
 213.  See Shapiro, supra note 207, at 731 & n.4 (“Th[e] idea—that judges at times may properly 
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Starting with audience, judicial explanations in any form are 
foremost intended for those who will feel their direct impact: the 
litigants.  Without question, there are numerous others who might read, 
learn from, and debate a judicial opinion, including lawyers, other 
judges, law students, scholars, and the general public,214 but the parties 
are the primary audience seeking to understand the result.  After all, they 
may want to take some further action because of it, such as appealing an 
incarceration, collecting on a judgment, distributing assets of an estate, 
or marrying the person they love.  Accordingly, there is a practical 
justification for wanting an available and accessible explanation.215  
There is a theoretical reason too that aligns with the objectives of 
credibility and confidence described above; the parties have placed their 
problem in the judge’s hands and no doubt want to understand why the 
relief they seek has been granted or denied.  Providing reasons for the 
result affords the parties respect and shows that the decision was 
sufficiently important to merit the judge’s keen attention.216  Such 
explanations are equally valuable when they are issued by trial courts as 
by appellate courts.217  In both cases, the judge and those directly 
affected by the ruling are part of a community that shares a common 
interest in reaching a fair outcome.  As Professor Frederick Schauer has 
                                                          
sacrifice openness and candor for the sake of other goals—has been expressed in many ways by a 
number of observers.”); see also Cohen, supra note 130, at 1100–02 & n.34–35 (summarizing and 
citing to legal scholarship in favor of and against the “inherent requirement of the judicial function to 
give candid reasons”); Schwartzman, supra note 212, at 988–89 & n.2 (describing debate about 
judicial sincerity).   
 214.  Lebovits et al., supra note 175, at 246.  See generally Wanderer, supra note 208, at 52–55 
(describing different audiences for judicial opinions). 
 215.  Wanderer, supra note 208, at 51.   
 216.  Mathilde Cohen, Reason-Giving in Court Practice: Decision-Makers at the Crossroads, 14 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 257, 258 (2008) (“Reason-giving shows respect. It demonstrates that attention has 
been paid to the special features of a case and the parties involved.”); Michael M. O’Hear, 
Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 481 (2009) (“Properly understood, procedural 
justice requires not just the possibility that the judge could have considered and rejected the 
defendant’s arguments on neutral, rational grounds, but also some meaningful reassurance that the 
judge actually did so.”); Wanderer, supra note 208, at 51 (“By showing respect for the people 
affected by their rulings and encouraging this form of participatory democracy, courts encourage 
respect for the judicial system and widespread acceptance of their opinions.”). 
 217.  See Oldfather, supra note 208, at 1285 & n.6, 1289–91 (citing appellate courts that criticize 
trial courts for not providing reasoning and exploring reasons why trial courts would explain their 
decisions); see also Wald, supra note 154, at 907 (“[G]reat judges of the past are celebrated not for 
the way they voted, nor for the number of times they were affirmed or reversed by the Supreme 
Court, but rather for their ability to devise apt, just, and understandable rules of law; they are held up 
as models because they were able to bring to clear expression thoughts that in lesser minds would 
have remained too vague and confused to serve as adequate guideposts for human conduct.”).  
Following this rationale, even private forms of justice should require a decision-maker to explain the 
result to the parties, notwithstanding that the result will not bind others in the future, because it will 
help parties regulate and adapt, if necessary, their future conduct. 
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stated, “giving reasons is a way of opening a conversation” which 
ultimately can make “the subject of the decision feel[] more a part of the 
decision, producing the possibility of compromise and the respect for a 
final decision that comes from inclusion.”218 
This idea that explanations reinforce the decision-maker’s legitimacy 
is supported by empirical studies that examine how and when individuals 
perceive a system as fair.  Recognizing that legal authorities of any kind 
are effective only when they are able “to gain acceptance for their 
decisions among the members of the public with whom they personally 
deal,” Professor Tom Tyler has found that a legal authority’s process and 
“process oriented problem solving” is key to trust.219  Tyler’s work 
examines how individual members of the public respond to negative 
outcomes of “service” encounters with legal authorities, where those 
members are seeking some form of help, and “regulatory” encounters, 
where the legal authorities are trying to bring the member of the public’s 
conduct in line with established rules.220  In both instances, the studies 
reveal that contrary to general intuition “both the willingness to accept 
outcomes and feelings about the decision-maker are dominated by 
reactions to the process used by that decision-maker to deal with the 
issues involved in a personal encounter” more than they are tied to 
outcome.221  Thus, for example, “‘citizens’ accounts suggest that they 
focus on whether they are treated with respect and dignity, whether 
[authorities’] actions are explained, and whether they are listened to and 
have their views considered.”222  According to these psychological 
studies, taking the time to explain a decision will encourage members of 
the public to trust the judge, to see her decision as legitimate, and to 
abide by it to a greater degree than they would do if she simply exerted 
power, force, or control.223 
                                                          
 
 218.  Schauer, supra note 183, at 658. 
 219.  See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 361, 362–63 (2001) [hereinafter Tyler, Trust].  See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY 
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 83 
(1997). 
 220.  Tyler, Trust, supra note 219, at 364–65. 
 221.  Id. at 367; see also id. at 372–91 (describing empirical study and specific findings). 
 222.  Id. at 394; see also id. at 384 (“The approach that is most consistent with the research 
reviewed here involves efforts to treat citizens fairly and respectfully, listening to them and 
communicating explanations for [authorities’] actions.”). 
 223.  Id. at 391–405; Leib et al., supra note 18, at 718 n.104; see also Oldfather, supra note 208, 
at 1284 (taking the time to articulate the rationale for an opinion can help a judge to be more 
mindful); Schauer, supra note 183, at 657–58 (“Under some circumstances, the very time required to 
give reasons may reduce excess haste and thus produce better decisions.”); R. George Wright, The 
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Accepting the relatively straightforward idea that the judicial process 
functions best when decisions are explained, legal scholars and judges 
have avidly debated the more nuanced elements of content and form that 
serve to enhance clarity, to “constrain arbitrariness,” and to fortify the 
system of stare decisis.224  For example, some commentators have 
observed how the most seasoned and well-respected judges employ a 
particular style225 when they deliver their rulings and, conversely, how 
certain courts obfuscate their rulings through confusing linguistic 
choices.226  Other scholars have promoted the use of specific rhetorical 
techniques,227 which make judicial decisions more accessible to their 
audiences and therefore more worthy of respect.228  Yet others have 
advocated for restrained and minimalist decisions,229 for candid and 
sincere decisions,230 and for moral and ethical decisions.231  Although 
varied in approach, these diverse scholars share the common objective of 
proposing ways that judges can help enhance legitimacy and build 
                                                          
Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1420–21 (2006) (deciding 
cases necessarily involves intuition but “an opinion accompanying an intuitionist outcome can itself 
amount to reasonable evidence that the judge has taken full, careful, empathetic, and detailed 
account of all of the main interests and concerns of the opposing and other affected parties.”). 
 224.  Lebovits et al., supra note 175, at 244–46; see also Schauer, supra note 183, at 657–58 
(describing justifications for reason-giving, including showing respect and commitment and 
counteracting “bias, self-interest, insufficient reflection, or simply excess haste . . . .”); Wanderer, 
supra note 208, at 49 (“Judicial scholars in the United States . . . emphasize the importance of 
writing a reasoned justification for the outcome in a case as a way of achieving the goals of our 
judicial system: (1) guiding the participants in the legal process, (2) persuading judges, officials, and 
citizens that the court has reached the proper resolution of a dispute, (3) limiting judicial 
arbitrariness, and (4) legitimizing any judicial departures from apparently established law.”). 
 225.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 63 (2008) (pointing to Holmes, Brandeis, 
Cardozo, and Hand as “examples of judges who succeeded by their example in altering the norms of 
opinion writing”); Posner, supra note 212, at 1426–32 (describing “pure” style of Justices Cardozo, 
Brandeis, Frankfurter, Brennan and the second Harlan, in contrast with the “impure” style of Justices 
Holmes, Douglas, Black, Jackson and Learned Hand, with Judge Friendly in the middle). 
 226.  See Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction 
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 140 (1998); see also POSNER, supra note 140, at 237–38 (describing 
“signs of bad judicial writing”). 
 227.  Devices might include: figurative language, see, e.g., Wanderer, supra note 208, at 66–69; 
natural language, see, e.g., Wald, supra note 208, at 1417–18; and empathic dialogue, see Mitchell 
F. Crusto, Empathic Dialogue: From Formalism to Value Principles, 65 SMU L. REV. 845, 865–66 
(2012); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575–79, 1628 (1987).   
 228.  See POSNER, supra note 140, at 255–58 (providing rules that will help “both formalist and 
realist, and whether judge or law clerk” write “a better, a more readable, and also a more honest 
opinion”).  
 229.  See Schauer, supra note 183, at 654–56 (describing problems that stem from generalized 
reasoning); Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 183, at 7 (1996) (“Of course it is important to study what 
judges say; but it is equally important to examine what judges do not say, and why they do not say 
it.”).  
 230.  See Schwartzman, supra note 212, at 990–91; Shapiro, supra note 207, at 736–50. 
 231.  See Lebovits et al., supra note 175, at 286–309; Swisher, supra note 144, at 655–56.  
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confidence in the decision-making process.  As Professor Nancy 
Wanderer has explained, “[w]hen people do not feel committed to 
judicial pronouncements because they do not understand them or because 
they feel alienated from the judicial system itself, cynicism about legal 
institutions flourishes, potentially leading to outright disrespect for the 
law.”232 
All of this discussion boils down to the fact that those who care 
about their claims also care about the reasons why a decision-maker 
reached a particular outcome.  Were a judge to write that she spun a 
Roulette wheel or threw a dart to decide a case, however, we might be 
less sanguine about judicial explanations because reasons like these, 
albeit achingly sincere, do not enhance the judicial process’s 
credibility.233  This point may seem exaggerated but, in fact, audiences 
do express skepticism as to whether the reasoning that judges provide 
really and regularly reflects the grounds upon which those judges have 
decided the cases before them.234  After all, if we trust what Justice 
Cardozo wrote, and his many successors have analyzed, then we 
recognize that the judicial process involves both objective and subjective 
components.235  Accordingly, while a judge may purport to be relying on 
legitimate rationales for deciding a case in a particular way, she may 
actually be deciding the case on other, and potentially less defensible, 
grounds than the ones her decision proffers.236  Her legalist tendencies 
and training may be leading her to describe law-based reasons for the 
result, even though her attitudinal tendencies (her politics) may actually 
                                                          
 
 232.  Wanderer, supra note 208, at 51; see also POSNER, supra note 140, at 355 (noting that the 
factual complexity of modern federal litigation “makes good judicial writing more rather than less 
important, because judges have to learn to write about complexity in ways that they and their 
audience . . . can understand”); Schwartzman, supra note 212, at 990–91 (“[J]udges are charged with 
the responsibility of adjudicating legal disagreements between citizens.  As such, their decisions are 
backed with the collective and coercive force of political society, the exercise of which requires 
justification.  It must be defended in a way that those who are subject to it can, at least in principle, 
understand and accept . . . [Judges] who fail to give sincere legal justifications violate this condition 
of legitimacy.”). 
 233.  See Schauer, supra note 183, at 636 (discussing bad reasons for a decision); Swisher, supra 
note 144, at 656 n.87 (discussing arbitrariness of judicial coin-flipping). 
 234.  See Cohen, supra note 130, at 1099; see also Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994) (“Courts and judges always lie.  Lying is the nature of the 
judicial activity.”). 
 235.  See CARDOZO, supra note 141, at 112–13. 
 236.  See BYBEE, supra note 150, at 20–22 (describing public suspicions of judicial hypocrisy); 
Wright, supra note 223, at 1420–24 (describing role of judicial intuition).   
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be dictating the outcome.  Or even if her reasons are arguably legitimate, 
she may be disguising them for other, quite valid purposes.237 
Professor Keith Bybee has recognized this public and scholarly 
skepticism about the source of judicial decision-making and has 
explained why such skepticism is far less troubling than it may at first 
appear.238  In repeated surveys testing how the public views influential 
court decisions on important topics like health care reform and 
presidential election recalls, for example, a majority of participants 
opined that the judges’ decisions did not reflect the actual reasons for the 
results, which the public viewed as based on “personal or political 
beliefs.”239  Even as the public doubted that judges were candidly 
providing all of the reasons for their decisions, Bybee observed, the same 
participants in the surveys demonstrated nearly universal confidence in 
the judicial process; most people who were polled believed that the 
“single most important influence” on a judge, regardless of forum, was 
the judge’s “analysis and interpretation of the law.”240  Because of this 
tenacious belief that judges are seeking to do the best job possible within 
the confines of systemic and human limitations, litigants continue to 
place trust in and rely on the process.241 
                                                          
 
 237.  See Cohen, supra note 130, at 1115–21; Schwartzman, supra note 212, at 988–89. 
 238.  See Keith J. Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead! Long Live the Rule of Law!, in WHAT’S LAW 
GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE, 306–07 
(Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) [hereinafter Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead]; BYBEE, supra note 
150, at 5–6 (“Public skepticism about whether judges actually mean what they say is potentially 
corrosive, but it also points to an enabling dynamic that makes possible the exercise of legal 
power.”).  
 239.  Keith J. Bybee, All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: A Response, 38 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 215, 217 (2013) [hereinafter Bybee, A Response] (quoting Kaiser Family 
Foundation study); see also BYBEE, supra note 150, at 16–18 (describing polls designed to survey 
public opinion of state courts, federal courts, and “courts in general” that reflect similar findings); 
Bybee, The Rule of Law is Dead, supra note 238, at 308–13 (same).  
 240.  Bybee, A Response, supra note 239, at 217.  See also BYBEE, supra note 150, at 17–18 (“A 
large majority of the public appears to believe that the courts are principled institutions where 
political pressure and partisan rivalry have no place; at the same time, a large majority of the public 
also appears to believe that partisanship influences the judicial process.”); Bybee, The Rule of Law is 
Dead, supra note 238, at 308–13 (stating that “the public simultaneously believes in the 
evenhandedness of the federal courts and doubts the degree to which the federal judges actually stick 
to the law”). 
 241.  See BYBEE, supra note 150, at 102–03 (“[I]t is possible to see, contrary to conventional 
understandings, that law is not facing a grave threat to its stability.  It is true that our system is beset 
by suspicions of hypocrisy generated by clashing public perceptions of judicial action. . . . [T]he 
judicial process continues to endure because it suits the individuals it governs—at least if we 
understand these individuals to be motivated by a messy mix of principled belief and passionate 
demands.”). 
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In sum, although scholars have posited and challenged the many 
ways the foregoing traits manifest themselves, there is little doubt that 
principled adjudication requires a judge to refrain from pre-judging a 
matter, to work to understand the facts and issues as they arise and 
change over time, and to provide a mindful explanation of her reasoning, 
all in the service of reaching an outcome that is acceptable to the 
participants in the process.  Part IV considers how these basic but 
essential components of judicial decision-making shed light on the 
creation and administration of private donative trusts. 
V. APPLYING THE ANALOGY 
This Part contends that the impartiality, integrity, competence, and 
candor we expect from judges can help trustees, settlors, beneficiaries, 
and their respective counsel think about how to meet the donative trust’s 
challenges of fractionalized ownership and temporal uncertainty.  
Starting in reverse order, the first section below argues that just as judges 
who explain their decisions build confidence in the judicial process, so 
too can trustees engender trust from beneficiaries by providing 
explanations to accompany their actions.  This understanding can have a 
profound effect on the way trustees and settlors think about disclosure 
obligations and reliance on trust protectors.  Judicial competency 
standards, too, help refine ideas not only about how a trustee is selected 
but also about whether she should be allowed to delegate her duties.  
Judicial integrity ideals justify the moral element in the trust relationship 
even in the world of today’s management trust, administered primarily 
by professional fiduciaries.  Finally, principles of judicial impartiality 
and independence, which present the sharpest contrast between judges 
and trustees, expose some interesting problems that ultimately bear on 
trustee conduct and identity. 
A. Trustee Credibility and Explanations 
The idea that the judicial process gains legitimacy when judges 
provide reasons for their decisions has implications for how a trustee 
should interact with trust beneficiaries on an ongoing basis and over the 
term of the trust.  As noted above, a key quality of a well-respected 
decision-making process is thoughtful explanation of the basis for a 
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decision.242  Such explanation can reinforce the decision’s legitimacy 
because even when parties are disappointed with an outcome, they are 
more apt to accept the results—and the process—when the judge 
explains her underlying rationale.243  One reason for this acceptance is 
the audience’s recognition of the effort that explanation requires; this 
investment shows that the decision-maker has taken the matter seriously, 
has deemed it important, and has worked to resist the arbitrariness that 
can ensue when discretion is unbounded.244 
Mindful, regular, and open communication can have the same crucial 
impact on building and maintaining confidence in trustees and their 
decision-making processes.  Historically, trustees and settlors have 
resisted disclosure to trust beneficiaries, citing privacy and protective 
concerns.245  Even today, where many jurisdictions require some degree 
of trustee transparency, the disclosure commonly associated with trusts is 
not designed or intended to further the relationship among the settlor, 
trustee, and beneficiaries or to facilitate acceptance of how the trustee is 
administering the trust.  Rather, legislatures and commentators 
contemplate disclosure in the form of a copy of the trust agreement and 
an accounting or “report” that lists trust earnings, distributions, and 
expenditures.246  The beneficiaries can use this “report” to enforce their 
interests and keep trustees accountable, both of which are admirable but 
inherently adversarial goals.247  If a trustee makes an error, she can list it 
in the account, rely on the beneficiaries to notice and question it, and, to 
the extent they do not do so, use it to bind off any future objections once 
the objection period has expired.248  Because this form of disclosure 
                                                          
 
 242.  See supra notes 206–41 and accompanying text. 
 243.  See supra notes 216–23 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text. 
 245.  See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 246.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (amended 2010); Gallanis, supra note 63, 1600–03; Kevin D. 
Millard, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform and Report Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 373, 379–82 (2005). 
 247.  David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy 
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 199 (2002) (explaining that “[t]he duty to keep the beneficiaries 
reasonably informed of the administration of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee, for only by 
being informed can the beneficiaries know of and enforce their interests” (emphasis added)). 
 248.  See In re Trust No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 488 (Iowa 2013) (“Implicit in the 
protective nature of the duty to account is that the beneficiaries will be able to take action against the 
trustee should they discover the trustee has breached one of its duties.”); Estate of Alden v. Dee, 35 
A.3d 950, 959–60 (Vt. 2011) (agreeing with fiduciary that providing beneficiaries with annual 
accountings started statute of limitations period running on filing objections to trustee conduct); see 
also Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1627 (“First, and centrally, the duty to inform should result in the 
beneficiaries having sufficient information to safeguard their interests.”).  But see Marsman v. 
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provides no explanation for the trustee’s decision-making process, 
though, it does not serve the goals that candor achieves in the judicial 
process.  Cases often refer to beneficiaries who have lost confidence in 
their trustees because the trustees have not explained adequately the basis 
for their decisions and thereby treated the beneficiaries with the 
procedural respect they expect and deserve.249 
Trustees and trust scholars recognize disclosure obligations as 
secondary, rather than as a fundamental part of the trustee’s fiduciary 
duties; the unfortunate result for anyone who cares about the proper and 
long-term functioning of the trust relationship is the inevitable 
breakdown that lack of transparency breeds rather than the trust that 
explanations can inspire.250  Take, for example, the case of Rollins v. 
Rollins,251 which provides a representative depiction—through the 
                                                          
Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1031 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“That [the beneficiary] assented to the 
accounts is also no bar to recovery by his estate.  The judge found that he was in the dark as to his 
rights to receive principal . . . .”). 
 249.  See Smith v. SunTrust Bank, 754 S.E.2d 117, 121–22, 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing 
summary judgment for trustees based on statute of limitations where corporate trustee agreed to 
exercise its discretion and distribute all trust income to settlor’s daughter, a co-trustee and one of 
many trust beneficiaries, without inquiring as to other beneficiaries’ needs, but wrote a single letter 
to the other beneficiaries announcing this decision and telling them to “make a request for the 
Trustee to consider an income distribution to you” if they disagreed at any time); O’Riley v. U.S. 
Bank, N.A., 412 S.W.3d 400, 410–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), transfer denied (Oct. 29, 2013) (noting 
that although the “Trustee’s distribution decisions were the product of a thoughtful evaluation and 
review process and consistent with the terms of the Non–Marital Trust and Missouri law,” the 
institutional trustee (through its trust officer and trust management committee) did not appear to 
communicate their conduct and findings to the plaintiff-beneficiaries).  In the facts of Van Dusen, 
rather than communicate directly with the trust beneficiary about an uncontroverted distribution 
error, the trustee appeared to downplay the error and then argue that by acknowledging it during the 
course of litigation, the beneficiary had been placed on notice and should therefore be precluded 
from raising any claims regarding the mistake.  See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.  But 
it was the trustee’s failure to engage the beneficiary and explain the mistake in the first place that 
appears to have angered the beneficiary enough to lose confidence in the trustee after years of 
accord.  See supra note 115.  The trial court decision is filled with excuses for the trustee’s lack of 
candor.  See Van Dusen Trial Court at *4 (“Mrs. Van Dusen had free and ready access to the 
document itself, and has had multiple attorneys working on her behalf who were available to explain 
or examine this language if she had questions.  Moreover, there is no evidence that Mrs. Van Dusen 
ever sought explanation or clarification of this language from Wells Fargo.”); id. at *8 (“Virginia 
Van Dusen argues that the Trustee violated its duty of loyalty by failing to make a $49,247.42 
principal distribution, requested by Mrs. Van Dusen in 2001, and subsequently failing to inform Mrs. 
Van Dusen that it had not been made.  The Trustee argues that this was potentially due to an error or 
oversight by the Trustee, but that such an error has since been corrected, as the Trustee distributed 
the funds in 2011.”).  
 250.  See supra notes 206–41 and accompanying text. 
 251.  There were three decisions in the Rollins case.  The Georgia Supreme Court decision can 
be found at Rollins v. Rollins, 755 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 2014) [hereinafter Rollins Supreme].  The 
intermediate appellate court decision can be found at Rollins v. Rollins, 741 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. App. 
2013) [hereinafter Rollins Intermediate].  The trial court decision is not available but is quoted in the 
two appellate decisions [hereinafter Rollins Trial].   
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various court opinions and the parties’ appellate briefs—of how trustee 
disclosure obligations are ordinarily perceived and fulfilled.  The Rollins 
family patriarch established a series of trusts for the benefit of his nine 
grandchildren and more remote descendants and funded those trusts with 
interests in a multi-billion dollar assembly of family entities.252  The 
settlor’s two sons and a family friend served as trustees, and the sons also 
controlled the family entities.253  The lawsuit arose out of discontent on 
behalf of four of the settlor’s grandchildren who sought information from 
the trustees—their father and uncle—about transactions, both at the trust 
level and at the entity level, and accused the trustees of breaching various 
fiduciary duties, also in both roles.254  In refusing to order an accounting 
at the entity level, the Rollins trial court noted that the trustees had failed 
to provide any disclosure, but that the beneficiaries “ultimately received 
a report on trust assets and ‘complete relief’ on their requests for an 
accounting through discovery.”255  The intermediate appellate court 
reversed and ordered the trustees to account on the entity level, reasoning 
that although the trusts did not hold controlling interests in the entities, 
the same people were in control and therefore able to provide this 
information.256  This expansive (and quite surprising) disclosure order 
appeared to stem from the appellate court’s suspicion that the trustees 
were reluctant to communicate openly about the “complex web” of 
interactions between the entities and the trust.257  Although the Georgia 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the order requiring the trustees to 
account at the entity level, it acknowledged that the appellate court “may 
ultimately prove to be correct.”258  Emphasizing the equitable nature of 
trusts generally and disclosure requirements in particular, the highest 
court reversed because the intermediate court had failed to consider and 
accord any deference to the trial court’s discretion.259  The three Rollins 
                                                          
 
 252.  Rollins Intermediate, 741 S.E.2d at 253.  
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. at 253–54. 
 255.  Rollins Supreme, 755 S.E.2d at 729 (quoting Rollins Trial). 
 256.  Rollins Intermediate, 741 S.E.2d at 255–56. 
 257.  Id. at 253.  Language that supports the court’s suspicions includes the decision’s repeated 
reference to the sons’ functional control of the trust through their control of the entities, id. at 255–
56; the court’s recognition of the potential for “clever manipulation of corporate structure,” id. at 
258 (internal quotations omitted); and the court’s observation that actions affecting trust interests 
were taken “without notifying the beneficiaries,” id. at 260.  Where the sons did write to the 
beneficiaries, they were accused of mischaracterizing their status vis-à-vis the corporate entities; the 
court referred to this communication as “alleged subterfuge.”  Id. at 261. 
 258.  Rollins Supreme, 755 S.E.2d at 730. 
 259.  Id. at 730.  The Georgia Supreme Court also reversed the holding that a “heightened 
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decisions are interesting because of how they depict trustees’ and courts’ 
expectations and understanding of disclosure obligations: minimal at 
best. 
Appling a judicial paradigm would significantly alter how trustee 
disclosure is viewed based on the idea that the explanation behind 
decision-making itself is crucial to building and maintaining trust.260  In 
other words, disclosure not only satisfies the important goals of 
monitoring trustee conduct and providing finality but also enhances the 
beneficiaries’ confidence in the procedures employed by the trustee to 
reach her decisions about distributions and investments.261  Although a 
trustee should not be expected “to inform the beneficiaries of every 
aspect of administration of the trust or every request for distribution 
made to the trustees,”262 disclosure, whether in the form of a writing or a 
family meeting, should be aimed at helping the beneficiaries understand 
the trustee’s process of decision-making rather than simply providing 
“information about trust assets necessary to protect the beneficiaries’ 
interest.”263  To the extent that such disclosure displays the trustee’s 
effort and care, it has the potential to make the parties to the trust feel 
more committed to and respectful of the conduct, because they will be 
able to understand it and feel included and recognized by it.264 
Because this form of disclosure is about building and maintaining a 
relationship among the parties to the trust, a trustee’s communication 
                                                          
trustee-level fiduciary standard” should apply to the sons’ management of the corporate entities.  
The court reasoned that the settlor, who was a sophisticated businessman with full knowledge of the 
delicate role he was assigning his children, had constructed the trusts so that the decision-making 
rested at the entity rather than the trust level.  Moreover, the trusts owned only a minority interest in 
the entities.  Id. at 730–31.  Even this part of the decision, though, was remanded to the Georgia 
Court of Appeals, which was directed to apply the correct fiduciary standard “when considering the 
trustees’ conduct with regard to their management of the corporate family entities held within the 
trusts.”  Id. at 731. 
 260.  Cf. Schwartzman, supra note 212, at 989 (“Proponents of greater candor in the courts have 
argued that transparent decision making constrains the exercise of judicial power, makes judges 
more accountable to the law, provides better guidance to lower courts and litigants, promotes trust 
and reduces public cynicism, and strengthens the institutional legitimacy of the courts.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 261.  See Leib et al., supra note 18, at 718 n.104 (relying on work of Tom Tyler to explain that 
“the fiduciary principle’s notion of trust is a structural feature of the relationship at issue that 
facilitates ongoing willingness by a dependent party to abide by the fiduciary’s decision.  It is often 
the power itself, once conferred, that renders the beneficiary in a position where she needs to trust, 
even if she is in a psychological state of distrust”).  
 262.  Estate of Alden v. Dee, 35 A.3d 950, 962 (Vt. 2011). 
 263.  Id.; see also Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1616 (“Put differently: the more the agent’s 
decisions are known to (or discoverable by) the principal, the more likely it is that the agent will 
choose to act in the principal’s best interests.”). 
 264.  See Wanderer, supra note 208, at 51; see also Schwartzman, supra note 212, at 990–91 
(discussing sincerity and candor).   
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with a “trust protector,” rather than directly with beneficiaries, is unlikely 
to provide an acceptable substitute.265  Communicating with an 
information surrogate does not foster an exchange with the beneficiaries 
nor enhance their understanding of the trustee’s decision-making.  
Analogous to a judicial decision that reaches all audiences except for the 
parties involved, disclosure to a trust protector artificially creates more 
distance between the parties to the relationship instead of uniting them. 
Potential objections to recognizing that enhanced disclosure is 
essential to administering a trust and fostering confidence in that 
administration include that transparency will increase administration 
costs, require trustees to engage in conduct for which they are potentially 
unequipped, and provide fodder for lawsuits by greedy or disgruntled 
beneficiaries.  While a trust and its trustees may enjoy short-term 
efficiencies by simply acting, the long-term functioning of the trust 
relationship—and therefore, the long-term transaction costs—are likely 
to suffer.  Moreover, although this preferred form of disclosure might 
appear radical, in fact, many trustees—those who manage to avoid 
becoming embroiled in disputes and ultimately litigation—communicate 
regularly with their beneficiaries in just the way that a judicial analogy 
would encourage.266  Regular family meetings and periodic reports 
describing market conditions, investment tactics, distribution plans, and 
overall strategies for the trust allow these relationships to flourish.  This 
approach is taken by mindful and experienced trustees who value their 
long-term relationships with trust creators and the objects of their 
bounty.  Families that enjoy this type of relationship with trustees 
continue to seek services from those trusted members and advisors for 
generations. 
Objections to enhanced disclosure also can be seen as an opportunity 
for improving trustee selection.  Settlors choose trustees for any number 
of reasons: financial savvy, potential longevity, wisdom, experience, 
family awareness, cost, or recommendations from estate planning 
lawyers.  Understanding that a trustee’s role involves maintaining both 
property and relationships over time and being responsible not only for 
substance but also for process will impact a decision about who best fits 
this role.  Just because an institution, for example, has a solid reputation 
for sound investing will not necessarily mean that it is a good candidate 
to serve as trustee, especially if that position contemplates an ability to 
                                                          
 
 265.  See Gallanis, supra note 63, at 1624–26. 
 266.  See, e.g., In re Trust No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2013). 
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explain the decision-making process to the beneficiaries.  For example, 
will the institution put in place, and charge for, excessive layers of 
service to address this concern?  Whether to select a family member, an 
institution, a professional individual, or some combination of the 
foregoing is not a decision to be made lightly.  The potential trustee’s 
ability to relate information to the beneficiaries should factor into this 
analysis. 
In sum, providing a candid explanation of the basis for decision-
making is not only key to the trustee demonstrating to the other parties to 
the trust that she has done her job, but is also crucial to their ongoing 
confidence that, as time passes, the trustee will continue to administer the 
property in a way that serves all parties’ interests. 
B. Trustee Competence 
The judicial quality of competence translates quite smoothly to the 
law of trusts.  Like judges, trustees should be expected to understand 
both the “law” and the “facts” that bear on their decision-making.  What 
competence regarding the law might mean for trustees is that they 
understand the terms of the trust instrument and how existing default 
rules would fill any open spaces.267  To the extent a trustee does not 
understand the meaning of the governing document or how the common 
law and statutes affect its interpretation and their conduct, it would be 
appropriate for the trustees to “research” their obligations by hiring 
professional advisors like lawyers and accountants268 and even, like 
judges, to seek forms of continuing education. 
What competence regarding the facts might mean for trustees is that 
they should understand their beneficiaries’ full financial and personal 
circumstances, including their needs and risk tolerance, before making 
distributions.269  This requirement goes hand-in-hand with the disclosure 
and explanation described in the prior section; without inquiring about a 
                                                          
 
 267.  See supra note 40 (discussing trust default rules); see also Langbein, Mandatory Rules, 
supra note 35, at 1105 (“The law of trusts consists overwhelmingly of default rules that the settlor 
who creates the trust may alter or negate.”). 
 268.  SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.3 at 1174; see also Spurgeon & Ciccarello, supra 
note 42, at 1386–89 (distinguishing between attorney acting as fiduciary and acting as legal advisor 
to a fiduciary). 
 269.  Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (“action of trustee is 
‘arbitrary’ where he ‘is authorized to make payments to a beneficiary if in his judgment he deems it 
wise and he refuses to inquire into the circumstances of the beneficiary’” (quoting SCOTT ON TRUSTS 
§187.3 (Fratcher 4th ed. 1988))). 
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beneficiary’s needs, a trustee will lack competence to make distribution 
decisions.270  A recent New York case involving a disabled trust 
beneficiary provides a stark example of trustee incompetence and “a 
clarion call for all fiduciaries of trusts.”271  The subject trust in In re JP 
Morgan Chase Bank was a multi-million dollar special needs trust272 that 
the grantor established for the benefit of her “severely disabled” autistic 
son.273  The trustees—an institution and an attorney—were given 
“absolute discretion” to make payments to or for the benefit of the named 
beneficiary, but an accounting for the trust revealed that the trustees 
expended negligible sums for the beneficiary’s care.274  Upon further 
investigation by the surrogate’s court, the individual trustee admitted that 
“he had never visited [the residential home] to ascertain [the 
beneficiary’s] condition nor, more critically, his needs” nor had he 
“expended a single dollar on [the beneficiary’s] behalf in almost three 
years.”275  The corporate trustee’s response to inquiry displayed even 
greater incompetence; the bank tried to excuse its inattention by claiming 
a “lack of institutional capacity to ascertain or meet the needs of this 
severely disabled, institutionalized young man.”276  The judge found 
these excuses inadequate and suggested that the trustees hire a “care 
manager,” who thereafter was able to visit with the beneficiary, ascertain 
his needs, and report those needs to the fiduciaries.277  “[O]nce the 
Trustees were required to make themselves knowledgeable about [the 
beneficiary’s] condition and his needs, and the availability of services 
that would enable them to provide for those needs,” they used the trust 
funds for “the purposes his deceased mother anticipated and so deeply 
desired,” and the beneficiary began to recover and thrive.278  Not 
surprisingly, the court held that the trustees had violated their fiduciary 
                                                          
 
 270.  See id. (“That there is a duty of inquiry into the needs of the beneficiary follows from the 
requirement that the trustee’s power ‘must be exercised with that soundness of judgment which 
follows from a due appreciation of trust responsibility.’” (citations omitted)). 
 271.  In re JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 956 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012). 
 272.  For a recent article defining and describing “special needs trusts,” see Robert Whitman, 
Disinheritance: An Alternative for the Special Needs Trust, 41 EST. PLAN. 36, 36 (2014). 
 273.  In re JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 956 N.Y.S.2d at 857. 
 274.  Id. at 859–60.  More specifically, approximately three thousand dollars was spent on a 
“care manager” suggested to help with the beneficiary, amounting to less than one percent of the 
trust assets, over the five years of the trust’s existence; during this same time, the trustees were paid 
more than $52,000 in fiduciary commissions and more than $11,000 in attorney fees.  Id. at 860. 
 275.  Id. at 861. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. at 861–65. 
 278.  Id. at 865–66. 
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duties of care and loyalty because simply keeping the assets safe was 
inadequate; “basic principles of trust administration and fiduciary 
obligation,” the judge explained, mandate that trustees “take appropriate 
steps to keep abreast of [the beneficiary’s] condition, needs, and quality 
of life, and to utilize trust assets for his actual benefit.”279  In other 
words, to be competent, a trustee must investigate any areas where her 
expertise or knowledge about the beneficiary is incomplete. 
Factual competence also means that trustees should understand not 
only the beneficiaries but also the trust property.  Again, this guidepost 
for principled trust decision-making affects trustee identity because the 
settlor should only select a trustee who is able to manage and invest the 
trust property competently.280  But this guidepost also involves trust 
governance standards once a trustee has been appointed and, more 
specifically, calls into question the modern rule that allows trustees—
even those that are sophisticated—to delegate investment 
responsibilities.281  Traditional trust law held trustees accountable for 
losses that arose from their advisors’ investment decisions and also 
prohibited trustees from using trust funds to pay third parties who 
essentially were doing the trustees’ jobs, such as managing the trust 
portfolio.282  Modern prudent investment law “has abrogated the 
traditional prohibition on delegating investment responsibilities and has 
instead sought to encourage such delegation” to ensure that the people 
charged with making investment decisions understand portfolio theory.283  
Justifications for allowing this delegation include that, today, trustees 
must be familiar with different forms of investments in order to diversify 
adequately and will incur increased costs if they have to hire advisors to 
teach them about these investments as opposed to simply delegating the 
duty altogether.284  But this rule essentially absolves a trustee from 
liability for poor investment decisions once she has selected an advisor 
and told the advisor about the trust.285  Such complete relief from 
responsibility can have “potentially pernicious effects,” including, as 
Professor Stewart Sterk argues, encouraging all fiduciaries to hire (pay 
                                                          
 
 279.  Id. at 867–68. 
 280.  See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, Ch. 17 (Trustee’s Duties). 
 281.  See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.   
 282.  Sterk, supra note 51, at 865–66.  
 283.  Sterk, supra note 51, at 854; see also SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.3.   
 284.  See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text; Sterk, supra note 51, at 854. 
 285.  See Sterk, supra note 51, at 885, 899; SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 3, § 17.3; UNIF. 
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(c) (1994); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(c) (amended 2010). 
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for and rely on) investment advisors even if the trustees have the 
requisite expertise, encouraging less sound investments, and, in the case 
of an insolvent advisor, shifting the burden of losses from the trustee, 
who selected the advisor, to the beneficiaries, who did not.286 
The competence component of the trustee-as-judge paradigm helps 
demonstrate why it is appropriate to leave responsibility for making 
competent investment decisions in the trustee’s ultimate discretion, even 
if she hires advisors to help her do so.  Like judges who might be 
unfamiliar with particularly tricky fact-based questions that affect case 
outcomes, trustees understandably might be unfamiliar with financial 
instruments that modern trust investment rules expect them to understand 
and master.287  Trustees, like judges, should be allowed to rely on 
“experts” for help, especially if the trustee is a friend or family member.  
But using an experienced investment advisor to provide guidance should 
not be synonymous with ceding responsibility for an essential component 
of the trustee’s job.  Again, that form of delegation saps the 
beneficiaries’ trust in the trustee.  Instead, trustees should be allowed to 
pay these experts to provide advice, listen to the advisors’ recommended 
investment plans, but choose the approach that best matches the trust’s 
other requirements, including risk tolerance and beneficiary needs. 
C. Trustee Integrity 
Judicial integrity requirements echo the fiduciary duty of loyalty and 
thereby reflect and help justify the moral obligations inherent in fiduciary 
law, even at a time where trusts have increasingly become about asset 
management.  One concern with the judicial paradigm is that the law is 
already in danger of over-romanticizing the role of fiduciary and none 
more so than trustee;288 conferring additional prestige on trustees by 
comparing them to judges will hardly provide an effective counter-point 
to what has been criticized as “pulpit-thumping rhetoric” about trustees 
generally.289  While modern trust law fundamentally altered the trustee’s 
                                                          
 
 286.  See Sterk, supra note 51, at 899–904. 
 287.  See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.   
 288.  See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.); Frankel, supra note 
10, at 829–30. 
 289.  Langbein, Contractarian Basis, supra note 2, at 629; see also Alexander, supra note 10, at 
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less trustworthy results in cases alleging breach of fiduciary duties).  
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duties and powers vis-à-vis investments, it did not have a similar effect 
on the trustee’s responsibilities for distributing funds impartially and 
fairly.290  In that regard, the modern trustee still resembles the trustee of 
old—the equitable feoffee—who was charged with deciding when trust 
property was to be paid out to or for the benefit of one or another of its 
beneficiaries or reinvested and held for the future.  The moral obligation 
that originated with the trust’s birth in equity,291 even if it arguably has 
lost some vitality in the face of today’s expansive management powers 
and duties, continues to ring true where the fiduciary is considering how 
to weigh her personal interests against those of the beneficiaries or how 
to weigh those beneficiaries’ competing needs. 
More broadly, though, the trustee-as-judge paradigm highlights why 
the rhetoric of morality cannot be easily severed from discussions about 
trust law.  First, as Professor Tamar Frankel has explained, fiduciary 
relationships center on the idea of altruism, meaning that “once an 
individual undertakes to act as a fiduciary, he should act to further the 
interests of another in preference to his own.”292  Expecting and requiring 
that a trustee display integrity benefits the beneficiaries and settlor, 
whom the trustee serves, and, in exchange, encourages their faith in the 
trustee’s decision-making.293  In fact, “the moral feature of fiduciary law 
forms a bridge between altruism and individualism by focusing on . . . 
not[] merely the interests of others, but also the collective good . . . .”294  
More simply, this focus helps build the very trust that fosters both 
personal and professional relationships.295  Second, the rhetoric of 
morality and its corresponding expectation that trustees display integrity 
helps trustees understand the standards to which they are being held, 
including that they are serving those who occupy a more vulnerable 
                                                          
 
 290.  See supra notes 42–60 and accompanying text. 
 291.  See Frankel, supra note 10, at 831 (positing that courts may have imposed high moral 
standards on fiduciary conduct “because of the historical jurisdictional authority over fiduciaries in 
the ecclesiastical and equity courts” which “imposed sanctions based on religion and morality, and 
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 292.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 830. 
 293.  See id. (“[O]nce a person becomes a fiduciary, the law places him in the role of a moral 
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 294.  Id. at 832; see also Leib et al., supra note 18, at 729 (“[R]einforcement of the fiduciary 
principle through law is just one way to signal and frame the more basic moral norms that the 
relationship triggers and that the law recognizes.  As a general matter, we tend to see large-scale 
compliance with private fiduciary obligations because the norms are so deeply rooted and function 
mostly extrajudicially.”); FitzGibbon, supra note 85, at 305 (fiduciary relationships “facilitate the 
doing of justice, . . . promote virtue, and . . . enhance freedom in a distinctive way.”). 
 295.  See supra notes 21–22. 
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position.296  As Professor Melanie Leslie has shown, when a trustee can 
appreciate the social norms attendant to her conduct, policing that 
conduct is easier.297  In other words, requiring that trustees display 
integrity helps the trustee understand her obligations.  Third, integrity, 
like competence and candor, helps settlors choose trustees and decide the 
degree of discretion to confer on them.298  The greater integrity a trustee 
displays, the greater discretion she merits.  If the moral component of 
trust law is “modifiable by contract,” or, in other words, not seen as 
central to the trust relationship, a settlor would have to try to anticipate 
every possible breach of duty that might arise.299  Finally, as noted 
above, having integrity also means exercising discretion with equal 
degrees of restraint and courage.300  Trustees may opt to embrace the 
status quo because doing so seems like the most prudent course, but 
integrity in decision-making sometimes requires more action, more 
flexibility, or more certainty. 
Like a judge, the trustee is charged with maintaining a community of 
interests, none of them truly her own.301  How she appears to the 
community with which she is involved is therefore intimately tied into 
her actual job, because her trustworthiness rises and falls with both her 
personal and professional integrity.  We expect judges to display this 
quality of integrity, because anything short of it undermines confidence 
in the work they do.  For similar reasons, integrity is important to a 
trustee, even when the trustee is professional, institutional, and fee-
driven. 
D. Trustee Impartiality and Independence 
Coming full circle, the notion that a decision-maker should be 
impartial and resist pre-judging is hardly novel but nevertheless provides 
a useful framework for guiding a trustee to make prudent and responsible 
                                                          
 
 296.  Frankel, supra note 10, at 831–32; Leslie, supra note 6, at 90–94. 
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investments and distributions, especially as time passes and the 
beneficiaries’ circumstances change from what they were when the trust 
was created.  Trustees often distribute assets to beneficiaries in 
established patterns.302  But pre-judgment and inattention to process 
stunts the functioning of the donative trust; deliberate focus on the 
parties’ respective needs fosters health and longevity in these often-
intimate, long-term relationships.  Consider if the Van Dusen trustee had 
envisioned itself in the role of arbiter, with a judge’s corresponding 
obligations.  Whenever the time came to decide whether to distribute 
principal to Virginia, the trustee-as-judge would not have pre-determined 
whether a distribution was warranted, but instead would have considered 
Virginia’s needs and assets at that point in time, in light of market trends 
and other competing interests and the level of discretion and direction the 
settlor provided in the trust agreement; the trustee then would have 
disclosed the distribution it decided to make and the reasons for it. 
Professor Geyh’s three dimensions of judicial impartiality reflect this 
process and are helpful in parsing out how trustees might approach their 
roles based on audience.  The first dimension of judging, which Geyh has 
identified as referring to the parties to a case, correlates to the trust 
beneficiaries who seek a fair process and are “more apt to accept adverse 
outcomes” if they perceive that they were treated in a way that indicates 
their matter was not determined before it arose.303  Here, then, value 
derives from a trustee taking time, each distribution period, to review 
how changed circumstances have affected the trust’s directives, 
investment results, and each beneficiary’s needs.  Some might argue that 
this type of deliberation will add costs to administering the trust.  In fact, 
though, this directive provides flesh to the oft-repeated phrase that 
discretion is judged by conduct rather than results.304  Moreover, as noted 
above, it is hard to imagine that any short-term extra administrative costs 
that enhance the deliberation process would exceed the long-term 
damages caused by litigation and any associated transition costs borne by 
the trust when the trustee ultimately resigns or is replaced.305 
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The second dimension of judicial impartiality, as Professor Geyh 
characterizes it, relates to how the public views a judge’s decision-
making process and whether that process reinforces the system’s 
legitimacy.306  For trustees, this “political” or more global component of 
impartiality impacts the larger world of property owners—and potential 
settlors in particular; every time a trustee is accused of pre-judging a 
matter or acting on auto-pilot, the utility of the trust vehicle is called into 
question, regardless of the outcome.  For example, in an article entitled 
Losing Faith in JP Morgan, Two Churches Claim Self-Dealing,307 the 
author describes claims recently filed against the mammoth institutional 
trustee308 for investing substantially in its own funds.309  Regardless of 
who ultimately prevails on these claims alleging violations of the duty of 
loyalty, the trustee’s decision to invest a majority of trust assets in its 
own funds appears to be systematic, based on sheer volume alone, and 
thus has the potential to undermine public confidence.  In contrast, a 
trustee who takes decision-making seriously by considering distributions 
and investments at regular intervals and in conjunction with other 
available options helps inspire confidence in trust planning and thereby 
serves this larger, “more diffuse” institutional interest.310 
The third dimension of impartiality relates to the trustee’s own vision 
of her job, her “self-identity.”311  Those who are appointed as trustees are 
not required to accept the responsibilities.312  Indeed, being named to 
hold and manage a family’s ongoing and future financial welfare is an 
awesome task that requires serious attention; adhering to principles of 
impartiality may enhance the trustee’s self-identity and confirm her 
position as a decision-maker who cares for all the members of the family 
without favoritism and prejudgment.  So, for example, trustees, even if 
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they are members of the family, are entitled to view themselves as 
professionals and charge “reasonable” fees for their services so that they 
devote the necessary time to their jobs.313  Professional fiduciaries, 
conversely, should examine whether their tradition of charging by their 
fee schedules as determined by the assets under management relates in 
any meaningful way to the effort they expend and the conduct that is 
expected from them.314 
Trustee independence, as distinct from impartiality, is another 
question altogether and arguably exposes the judicial analogy’s greatest 
flaw.  A judge should never preside over a dispute that involves her own 
interests because doing so undermines the credibility of the judicial 
system.315  In contrast, though, many trustees administer trusts in which 
they are beneficiaries, leading to some of the nastiest breach of duty 
cases.316  A typical example is provided by Carter v. Carter, in which the 
settlor’s daughter, who was the trust’s remainder beneficiary, sued her 
step-mother, who was the trust’s income beneficiary and trustee, alleging 
that the step-mother had breached her duties of care and loyalty by 
investing solely in tax-free municipal bonds.317  The trust instrument did 
not permit the step-mother to receive distributions of principal but 
authorized her, as trustee, to generate income by investing in any 
property “regardless of diversification and regardless of whether the 
property would be considered a proper trust investment.”318  The 
daughter claimed that her step-mother’s investment strategy “failed to 
protect the principal of the Marital Trust against inflation,” thereby 
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eroding the value of the principal in violation of her fiduciary duties.319  
A sophisticated investor, the step-mother provided evidence that she 
“evaluat[ed] over the course of time” her investment strategy by 
“read[ing] the newspapers, the various financial reports, listen[ing] to 
television, talk[ing] to her friends and her children, who are 
stockbrokers, et cetera, et cetera.”320  Explaining that the prudent investor 
rule required the step-mother-trustee “to be mindful of [her step-
daughter’s] interests” and to act consistently with those interests 
“regardless of whether she was acting in good faith or bad faith,” the 
court refused to interfere with the “interested” trustee’s exercise of 
discretion because she did not “act in a wholly unreasonable and 
arbitrary manner.”321  Whatever can be said about the Carter trustee’s 
discretion, her decision-making certainly challenges the ideal of 
independence.  A judge with this type of interest in a decision’s outcome 
would never be countenanced. 
Rather than expose a weakness of the trustee-as-judge framework, 
though, the questions that the “interested” trustee-beneficiary status 
raises help reveal one of the analogy’s most potent contributions because 
these concerns help increase sensitivity to trust design and trustee 
selection.  Choosing a loved one as trustee often makes sense because 
that “interested” person may have the most familiarity with the trust 
assets, the most sensitivity to family dynamics, or, in the case of a 
surviving spouse, the most desire and justification for autonomy vis-à-vis 
assets that are essentially shared property of the marriage, title 
notwithstanding.  Allowing a beneficiary to manage assets that she 
helped accumulate, subject only to the oversight that fiduciary duties 
impose on her, often is the best option for achieving the settlor’s goals.  
But a settlor should not abandon the benchmark of independence lightly.  
Even if she thinks that naming a financially savvy spouse or child to 
manage assets for her own children or siblings will confer the greatest 
economic benefit on the trust, this potential advantage must be part of a 
comprehensive inquiry that also considers the qualities discussed earlier, 
including the potential trustee’s candor, competence, integrity, and 
impartiality to determine if the sacrifice is worthwhile.  Relatedly, 
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trustee-beneficiaries can best segregate their interests and maintain their 
independence as trustees by adhering to these ideals.  Even a truly 
“independent”—in other words, disinterested—trustee, who initially may 
cause the beneficiaries to have more trust in her decision-making, 
because she is independent, will fail if she does not display the other 
judicial qualities described above.322  And if the settlor decides that the 
benefits of naming an “interested” trustee outweigh its costs, a solution 
may be to divide the duties among co-trustees.323  By directing attention 
to the importance of independence and the trust that is eroded when that 
independence is sacrificed, the trustee-as-judge paradigm can enhance 
trust creators’ ability to anticipate and design plans that have a chance of 
operating smoothly on into the future. 
VI. CONCLUSION: TOUCHSTONES OF TRUST 
A black siliceous stone that was once used to test the purity of gold, 
a touchstone, has come to mean “something that is used to make 
judgments about the quality of other things.”324  In thinking about the 
challenges that are posed by private donative trusts, the judicial process 
provides an apt touchstone for trustee decision-making.  An ideal judicial 
process prioritizes candor, competence, integrity, and impartiality, which 
together emphasize relationship and procedure ahead of actions and 
results.  So too do these qualities provide some guiding principles for 
those seeking to facilitate the way that trusts function in the lived world.  
In other words, the qualities that make for principled adjudication can 
help trustees accomplish their investment and distribution directives, 
help settlors (and their estate planners) better select trustees and guide 
their conduct, and ultimately help enhance beneficiaries’ trust in the 
trustee’s exercise of her discretion. 
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